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Induction is the process by which we reason from the particular to the general; 
In this paper we use ideas from the theory of abstract machines and recursion 
theory to study this process. We focus on pure induction in which the conclusions 
"go beyond the information given" in the premises from which they are derived 
and on simple induction, which is rather a stark kind of induction that deals with 
computable predicates on the integers in rather straightforward ways. Our basic 
question is "What are the relationships between the kinds of abstract machinery 
we bring to bear on the job of doing induction and our ability to do that job 
well ?" Our conclusions are as follows: (1) If we use only the abstract machinery 
of the digital computer in a computing center (which we assume to be capable 
of only evaluating totally computable functionals or functionals in 210 of the 
Arithmetic Hierarchy) then a single inductive procedure can only develop 
finitely many sound theories. (2) If we use only the abstract machinery of the 
mathematician (which we assume to be the machinery required to evaluate a
functional in 271 of the Arithmetic Hierarchy) then we can develop inductive 
procedures that generate infinitely many sound theories but no procedure that is 
analytic in the sense that the theories it puts forth as sound will be sound in "all 
possible worlds." (3) If we use the machinery of the trial and error machine (or 
the machinery required to evaluate functionals in 272 of the Arithmetic Hierarchy) 
then we can develop consistent procedures for induction but none that are 
complete in the sense that they generate all useful theories in a fairly natural 
sense of "useful." (4) Finally, if we use the machinery of the hyper-trial-and- 
error machine (or the machinery required to evaluate functionals in 2~3 of the 
Arithmetic Hierarchy) then we can develop rocedures that are both consistent 
and complete. 
l. PURE INDUCTION 
Induct ion is the process we use when we derive general conclusions f rom 
particular premises.  If, for example, we conclude that "all swans are whi te"  
because we have observed a hundred  swans, all of which were white, we are 
doing induction, in  this paper, I want  to study induct ion f rom a rather abstract 
point of view and to ask some questions about the structure of this process. 
I am concerned primari ly with what  I call pure induction in which the con-  
clusions derived might  be said to "go beyond the  information given" in the 
premises in the sense that we can deduce things f rom the conclusion that  we 
cannot deduce from the premises. Our swanish inference is an example of such 
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induction because the conclusion ("all swans are white") deductively implies 
that swans we have not yet seen will be white. But this does not appear to be 
deductively implied by the premises because it is quite consistent with those 
premises that all swans we have not yet seen will be purple. 
Induction is pure in our sense if its soundness cannot be accounted for in the 
same way that we account for the soundness of deduction. This excludes uch 
deductive induction as mathematical induction and perfect induction. It includes 
the kind of induction done by the scientist when he or she derives a general 
theory from specific evidence and by the child when it learns a general principle 
from specific examples. 
It is largely because it goes beyond the information given that we value pure 
induction. It allows the scientist o derive theories from which he or she can 
deduce predictions of things not yet observed. It allows the child to learn 
principles that it can apply to things it has not previously experienced. 
It is because its soundness cannot be accounted for on the same grounds as 
sound deduction that pure induction puzzles us. We know that some pure 
inductions are sound and others are not but there remains considerable contro- 
versy over what the grounds for this distinction are. 
We can be somewhat more precise about what makes induction "pure." An 
induction takes a set of premises P = {Pl, P2 ,...} into a conclusion C. Let us 
call the ordered pair (P, C} an inductive inference and call such an inference 
a pure inductive inference if there exists some statement S, such that P and C 
together deductively imply S, but P alone does not, which is to say that the 
conjunction of P and the negation of S are consistent. We call a procedure for 
dealing with inductive inferences pure if it deals with inductive inferences that 
are pure in this sense. 
We will study two types O f pure inductive procedures, both of which we 
represent by abstract machines. One kind of procedure generates a conclusion 
from a set of premises. Such procedures will be represented by abstract devices 
that we will call induction machines or generators (Fig. 1). A second kind of 
procedure generates judgments on the soundness of an inference (or premise, 
conclusion pair). Such procedures will be represented by abstract machines that 
we will call inductive logics or recognizers (Fig. 1). 
I INDUCTION 1 [;>conclusion premises ~> IACH INE 
inference-~ INDUCTIVELoGIC I--'-'~judgement 
Fro. 1. An induction machine and an inductive logic. 
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Our main concern will be wkh the relationships between the kinds of 
machinery we use in constructing such machines and logics on the one hand 
and the sets of situations in which they yield sound results on the other. Such 
concerns are similar to the concerns of the logician who studies deduction 
(which is far better understood than induction) when he or she asks questions 
about the possible completeness and consistency of formalizations limited to 
certain means. 
Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows: The kinds of abstract 
machinery that most people allow themselves to use in constructing pure 
induction machines and/or logics are not adequate to accomplish the goals that 
they have in mind when attempting such constructions. From this it will follow 
that we should probably either allow, ourselves to use more powerful abstract 
machinery in such constructions or we should change our goals in attempting 
such constructions. For example, we will show that inductive logics that are 
analytic in the sense that they accept, as sound, only those inductive inferences 
that are sound in "all possible worlds" cannot be characterized by axiomatic 
systems (or recursive numerations). This implies that we should either forgo 
our attempts to characterize analytic induction precisely or we should use 
means more powerful then those used in axiomatizations. 
2. SIMPLE INDUCTION 
Induction is, actually, a rather complex process that can be thought of as 
having several "parts." According to the most popular present-day account 
(known as the "hypothetico-deductive account") of this process, it can be 
thought of as consisting of the following basic steps: 
(i) Observation, in which the information, from which the conclusion 
will be derived, is gathered. 
(ii) Discovery, in which the evidence gathered in (i) is contemplated 
and a theory, T, of that evidence is generated. 
(iii) Deduction, in which the consequences of T are deduced. These 
consequences usually "go beyond the information given" in the observations 
on which T is based. 
(iv) Confirmation, i  which the consequences derived from T are compared 
with the results of further observations and the soundness of T is evaluated. 
Either the theory T is accepted or it is rejected. If it is rejected, the whole 
process begins anew. 
When the logician studies induction, it is customary for him or her to think 
of the process by which evidence is accumulated (i) as not really part of the 
logician's concern. Each of the other three steps, however, seems to have an 
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underlying logic that logicians have, to some degree, studied. The logic of 
deduction, which underlies (iii), has been the most thoroughly studied and 
developed. Although its foundations still involve some controversial issues, it is 
generally felt to stand on a firm footing. The- logic of confirmation is more 
controversial nd less well developed than the logic of deduction. But consid- 
erable progress has been made and logical theories of this process have been 
developed by Reichenbach (1938), Carnap (1962), and Hintikka (1966), among 
others. (Swinburne (1973) presents a survey of the present situation in this 
area.) 
The logical theory of discovery remains, however, the least well developed 
of the three. Indeed, it has been suggested by some (including Reichenbach 
(1939) and, most notably, Popper (1955)) that a strictly logical (in contrast o a 
psychological) account of discovery is not possible. Aristotle (1949) seems to 
have felt that it might be, and Peirce (1960) even suggested that a logical account 
of discovery, which he called "abduction" among other things, could play 
a significant role in a logical account of the scientific method. In this paper we 
will focus on the role of discovery in the scientific method and in induction 
in general. As recently as 1967, Chomsky, speaking at Berkeley (1968), was able 
to say that "no one [has taken] up Peirce's challenge to develop a theory of 
abduction [or discovery] . . . .  Even today, this remains a task for the future." 
Actually, before Chomsky spoke, some progress had been made toward the 
development of such a theory, motivated in part by Chomsky's own earlier 
work (1957). Thus Gold (1967) had published a paper studying the ways 
a child might go about learning the grammar of its native language from samples 
of grammatical utterances made by its elders. And Putnam (1962), apparently 
motivated by what he saw as gaps in Carnap's theory of scientific method, was 
developing similar ideas. 
These ideas have recently attracted considerable attention and have been 
the subject of papers by Blum and Blum (1975), Barzdin and Freivald (1972), 
Feldman (1972), Horning (1969), Jeroslow (1975), Kugel (1973), Minicozzi, 
Podnieks (1975), and Schubert (1974), among others. Papers on the relationships 
between abstract machines and induction that are very much in the spirit of 
this paper (and from which some of the ideas in this paper are derived) include 
papers by Biermann (1972) and Solomonoff (1964). 
In order to focus on the discovery component of induction, we will use a 
standard mathematical "trick." We will define a model for induction in which 
the other parts of the process are done so well or are so trivial that they cannot 
have very much influence on its results. It is this model of induction that we 
call "simple induction." 
Simple induction is induction whose subject matter is limited to functions on 
the positive integers. In doing it, we are given the values of some computable 
function, f, and asked to find a computer program, PM, that computes that 
function. The given values of the function are our evidence, or premises. Our 
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conclusions are programs for evaluating functions and such a program is said 
to be confirmed as a theory off, by a value f(x),  if PM(x) =f(x) (PM(x) is the 
value computed by the program PM when applied to x) and disconfirmed if 
PM(x) =# f(x). A program, PM, is said to express a correct theory of a function, f, 
if, for all values f(x) of f, PM(x) = f(x). It is this process of trying to guess 
functions from their values, limited to the special case of two-valued partial 
functions on the positive integers, that we will call simple induction. We will 
imagine this process as taking the values of the function, f, in their natural 
order: f(1),f(2),...,f(n),f(n + 1),... and producing a program, PM. We will 
call the process ound for f if PM expresses a correct theory off .  
In this paper we will focus on pure and simple induction only and, in order 
to avoid unnecessary repetition, we will call it simply "induction," assuming 
that the reader will recall that we are dealing with only a rather special kind 
of induction. I am going to argue that this simple model really covers far more 
of induction than it might at first appear. Thus, for example, the results we 
consider here, being primarily recursion theoretic results and thus invariant 
under recursive transformations ( ee Rogers (1967) for a discussion of this 
matter), apply to induction with far more complicated kinds of confirmation 
procedures thrown in, assuming that only the question "Does the set of 
evidence, E, disconfirm the theory T ?" can be answered by a partial computa- 
tion. It also applies to the induction of predicates over other recursively 
enumerable domains, and it seems, to me, to represent the structure of a quite 
considerable portion of pure induction. 
3. "HUME'S THEOREM" ABOUT PURE INDUCTION 
Inductive inferences are relatively easy for human beings to make and, on 
the whole, we tend to make them correctly. It has not been easy to develop 
machines that make them correctly nor to develop precise mathematical ccounts 
of what constitutes a sound inductive inference. One of the main difficulties 
we run into when we try to develop machines to make sound inductive inferences, 
or abstract (axiomatic) systems to characterize them, is that it is hard to say 
exactly what such machines or systems are supposed to do. Clearly they are 
supposed to make, or characterize, sound inductive inferences. But what makes 
an inductive inference sound ? It is not particularly l~ard to say what makes a 
deductive inference (rather than an inductive one) sound. A deductive inference 
is sound if it is absolutely truth perserving, where an inference is said to be 
absolutely truth perserving if its conclusions are true in all "possible worlds" (or 
interpretations) in which its premises are all true. (This idea is due to Leibnitz, 
1956.) 
This definition of deductive soundness is what "justifies" our use of sound 
deductive inferences. It tells us that we can use sound deductive inferences to 
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go from true statements (the premises of the inferences) to other statements 
(the conclusions of the inferences) that must be true because the premises are 
true. Unfortunately this does not seem to work for inductive inferences. We 
seem to be able to prove the following: 
*THEOREM 1 (Hume). Pure inductive inferences cannot be absolutely truth 
preserving. 
Apparent proof. Let us introduce some notation. We write "P ~ Q" for 
"P  deductively implies Q" and "P-+ Q" for "P  inductively implies Q." (The 
use of the single arrow is intended to suggest hat the relationship of inductive 
implication seems weaker than the relationship of deductive implication.) 
Consider an arbitrary pure inductive inference P--+ C. By the definition of 
"purity," there exists some statement S such that (1) C ~ S but (2) not P ~ S. 
Suppose, contrary to what is to be proved, that P -+ C is absolutely truth 
preserving. Then all the statements in P are true in any possible world that C 
is true in. Hence P ~ C by the definition of deductive soundness. Since C ~ S 
by (1) and deductive implication is transitive, P ~ S, which contradicts (2). 
This disproves the assumption that P--+ C was absolutely truth preserving. 
But P -~ C was an arbitrary pure inductive inference, which proves the 
*theorem. 
By Goedel's Completeness Theorem, if P --+ C is absolutely truth preserving, 
then P ~ C is provable in the first-order predicate calculus and hence deducible 
in that formal system. *Theorem 1 expresses one part of Hume's famous 
critique of induction (Hume, 1911), which argued (correctly) that induction 
was not reducible to deduction and (incorrectly, as we will show) that inductive 
inferences could not be absolutely truth preserving. 
We can think of an inference, Inf, whether deductive or inductive, as an 
ordered pair of sets of statements, (P, C) where P is the set of premises of Inf 
and C the set of its conclusions. We say that an inference, Inf ~ (P, C) is 
sound in a particular "worM" (or state of affairs), W, if either all the statements 
in P and C are (individually) true in W or if at least one of the statements in 
the set of premises, (Pi ~ P), is false in W. All that this excludes is the possibility 
that all statements of P are true in W and some statement in C is false. A world, 
W, in which this excluded condition is satisfied is said to disconfirm the 
inference Inf. *Theorem 1 then seems to have the following consequence: 
*COROLLARY 1.1. For any inductive inference there is some world, or possible 
state of affairs, that diseonfirms that inference. 
In view of this corollary (or *corollary) we seem to face a serious problem 
when somebody proposes an inductive inference P -+ C, for our use. We have 
the right to ask "What if this is one of those worlds in which P can be true 
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but C false ?" We want to use that inference to infer C from P but this use is 
not warranted in that world, and hence, perhaps, not in this one. 
The student of inductive inferences (but not their user) can avoid this problem 
by asking questions about inductive procedures rather than inductive inferences 
or, to put it in fancier terms, by shifting from the theory of inductive inference 
to the meta-theory of inductive inference. 
Given a procedure L, that makes inferences that are sound in some worlds, 
we can ask how many worlds its inferences are sound in and then argue that 
we should use those procedures that are sound in more worlds than any others. 
This would seem to increase the "odds" that the procedure we used was truth 
preserving in ours. Or we might have a choice between two procedures, L 
and L', where L works in all worlds that L' works in and then some. All other 
things being equal, we could then argue that L was the "better" procedure. 
This allows us to compare procedures for making inductive inferences without 
stopping to try to justify them in absolute terms. We are therefore led to ask 
the following two questions about procedures for doing induction: (1) Given 
the procedure L for making inductive inferences, what can we say about the 
set, W, of possible worlds in which the inferences made according to L are 
sound ? and (2) Given a limited kind of abstract machinery, what can we say 
about the possible worlds for which procedures, limited to that kind of abstract 
machinery, could possibly generate sound inferences ? Before we can turn to 
these questions, though, we need more precise definitions of the inductive 
procedures we are talking about. 
4. INDUCTION MACHINES 
Inductive inferences are made about radishes, swans, quasars, and all sorts 
of things. In this paper we will consider only inferences made about predicates 
over the positive integers. People seldom make inductive inferences about such 
predicates but the process of making them is both mathematically tractable 
and contains much, if not all, the structure of inductive inferences made about 
other things. And, since the technique of arithmetization allows us to represent 
inferences about swans, radishes, or quasars by inferences about predicates on 
the positive integers, we lose little in the way of generality. 
We can think of simple induction as a "game,' in which one of the players, 
N (for "nature"), picks a predicate, P, on the positive integers and another 
player, M (for either "man" or "machine"), then tries to guess the predicate. 
M's guesses of P will be based on information about he values of P for particular 
integers (and possibly on other information about P). To begin with, we assume 
M's guesses are based on the values of P, given to M in the natural order of 
their arguments. Thus, M might be told that P(1) was false, P(2) was true, 
and so forth. If M were told that P of l, 3, 5, 7, and 9 were false and that P 
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of 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 were true, M might guess that P (the predicate that will be 
called the subjiect of the induction) is the predicate that is true for even numbers 
and false for odd ones. It is easy to see that M might be right, and just as easy 
to see that M might be wrong. This is, of course, precisely the problem raised 
by *Theorem 1. 
We will think of M as an abstract machine, drawn from some set of abstract 
machines, say the set of Turing machines. Its input will represent the values 
of the predicate P that is the subject of a round of the game. These values, in 
turn, represent the premises of the induction. Its output will be a finite sequence 
of symbols representing a program PM. We will set a very strong condition 
on what will be required for 2V/'s inference to be sound. We will say that M's 
induction is sound for P if and only if P, the subject, and T, the conclusion, 
are exactly the same predicate. This is a much stronger condition on the 
soundness of inductive inferences than is usually called for in theories of such 
inferences. This is because we are studying induction from a slightly different 
point of view than is usual. 
We imagine that our guessing game is played arbitrarily often and that a 
different predicate is drawn (from the set of all predicates on the positive 
integers) for each round played. When M guesses a predicate correctly, that 
predicate is put into a set called the scope of M. When M guesses the predicate 
incorrectly it is placed in a set called M's  counterscope. And when M makes no 
guess at all for the predicate, it is placed into its undefined scope. We will focus 
our attention on the relationship between the nature of the machine M, on 
the one hand, and the nature of its scope and counterscope on the other. 
Before we do this, we briefly develop a theory of abstract machines and of 
what it means for such machines to "'guess predicates." We will be concerned 
exclusively with devices that we can think of intuitively (and somewhat 
incorrectly) as three-tape Turing machines. We will call them Turing mechanisms. 
They will have the following components: 
(1) Three one-way (to the right) infinite tapes, divided into squares 
which may be blank or contain symbols from a given fixed alphabet. The three 
tapes will be called the input, output, and work tapes. We will assume that M 
(the mechanism) can read the input tape, write the output tape, and both read 
and write the work tape on which it stores its intermediate r sults. 
(2) Three tape heads, one associated with each tape, which can be moved 
one square at a time to the right or the left of their current positions on the 
tapes that they are associated with. 
(3) A finite set of instructions that is called the mechanism's program and 
that controls its behavior step by (deterministic) step. 
(4) An internal register that can contain, at any given moment in time, 
t i , a single integer that is called the state of the mechanism at that time. 
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A program will be a finite set of instructions, each of the form [(r, s~), ( r ' ,  s 't ')]  
where: 
(1) r and r' are the names of states (integers) that the mechanism can 
assume. 
(2) s and s' are the names of symbols that can appear on one of the 
tapes of the mechanism, s' (but not s) can also be one of the symbols L or R 
that "order" a shift of the tape head one square to the left or the right of its 
previous position. (Note that, in our theory, the tape head moves, and not 
the tape.) 
(3) t and t' are each the names of one of the three tapes. 
If, at time t i ,  the machine's program contains an instruction Inst = 
[(r,  st) ,  ( r ' ,  s 't ')]  and both the internal state of M (the integer in the register) 
is equal to r and the symbol scanned by the tape head associated with the tape t 
is s, then we say that Inst applies at time t i . The set of instructions, or program, 
of M controls the condition of M from moment o moment according to the 
following rule: 
If Inst applies at time t i , it is executed in the interval between ti and ti+ 1 
producing the following changes. The content of the register becomes r ' (which 
may be the same as r) at time ti+ 1 and either (a) the currently scanned square 
of tape t' has the symbol s' written on it (replacing anything that was there at 
time ti) , or (b) if s' is one of the symbols L or R, then the tape head associated 
with tape t' is moved one square to the left or the right (respectively) in the 
interval between ti and ti+ 1 . If there is no instruction in M's  program that 
applies at Ci ,  the mechanism is unchanged from t i to ti+~ • (In most theories, 
the mechanism is said to "halt" at the first such ti .) 
We will be concerned only with mechanisms that are deterministic in the 
sense that it is never possible for more than one instruction to apply at any 
given moment. This can be guaranteed by the following condition on the 
program of M: 
Determin ism condit ion. Any two instructions in the program of M having 
the same register name (r) in their first pair ( r ,  s t)  must have different symbol 
names (s) and (since we have more than one tape) the same tape names (t) in 
their first pair. 
We henceforth use the term program only for sets of instructions that satisfy 
this condition. Such a program completely determines the transition of a 
mechanism from time t i to ti+ 1 . The condition of M at a time t i is completely 
defined by the sequences of symbols on each of the tapes at that time, the 
location of the associated tape head, and the internal state of the machine. 
We call such a description of such a "mechanism condition" an instantaneous 
description of the mechanism and denote the description of M at time ti by ID i .  
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An infinite sequence of such descriptions ID0, ID1 ,..., where iDi+ 1 is uniquely 
defined by the mechanism's program and the previous instantaneous description 
ID¢ in the way indicated above, completely defines the mechanism's behavior. 
We call it a behavioral description. 
It is important o note, and it is primarily because we want to note this that 
we are redoing the rather standard development of the idea of an abstract 
machine, that the behavior of a mechanism does not uniquely define a machine. 
A full definition of a machine requires more. It requires a specification of what 
features of the machine's behavior we are going to count as its input and its 
output, and of how we will interpret hese inputs and outputs. 
The inputs of our machines are sequences of symbols that we will associate 
with predicates and their values. Let the oracle, 0 e , of a predicate, P, be the 
one-way (to the right) infinite sequence So, h ,  s2 .... , si,  si+l ,... consisting of 
symbols from the alphabet o~ = {#, 0, 1, 2} such that: 
s o is the symbol # ,  
s i is the symbol that represents the values of P(i), where the symbols 0, 1, 
and 2 are said to represent he truth values false, true, and undefined (respec- 
tively). 
It is easy to prove the following: 
(1) There is precisely one oracle for each possible predicate on the 
positive integers and exactly one predicate for each oracle. 
(2) A traditional computing (or Turing) machine that is given access to 
the oracle of a predicate P can compute the value of P for any given argument 
in the sense that it can determine (using a fixed and finite program) the value 
of P for that argument. (The idea of an oracle is due to Turing (1939), who 
defined it in terms of this second condition.) 
Oracles will be the inputs of our inductive generators. They represent, in 
a way that should be relatively clear, the values of the predicate, P, that is 
the subject of the induction. The outputs of our generators will be the names 
of predicates, expressed by finite sequences of symbols from some fixed and 
given finite alphabet. We assume that a given name denotes at most one predicate. 
We can say some things about such induction machines (and their scopes) 
without saying anything more than this about them. 
5. SCOPES AND THEIR SIZES 
Let us begin by introducing some notation. We will write "M(P)  ~ T"  to 
express the fact that the machine Mgenerates the theory T for the predicate P. 
We are saying that T is the correct heory of P if and only if T = P. In terms 
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of this notation, the scope if M is the set S(M) = {P 1 M(P) = P} or the fixed 
points of M. We call a machine M complete with respect o a set of predicates W 
if the scope of M includes W (which i s just another way of saying that M 
generates a correct heory from the oracle of each member of W). And we call 
a machine cardinally complete with respect to W if the cardinality of (or number 
of predicates in) its scope is the same as or greater than the cardinality of W. 
If M is not complete with respect o W we say it is incomplete with respect o W. 
Cardinal incompleteness is defined similarly. One of the things that follow directly 
from our definitions is: 
THEOREM 2. Every generator (or inductive procedure) ~/I is cardinally incom- 
plete with respect to the set of all predicates. 
Proof. There are nondenumerably many predicates. But there are only 
denumerably many finite sequences on any given finite alphabet and hence 
only denumerably many distinct heories that M can possibly generate. A theory 
generated by M can place at most one predicate into the scope of M since it 
denotes (at most) one predicate. Hence there can be at most denumerably many 
predicates in the scope of M and since there are nondenumerably many predi- 
cates altogether, M must be cardinally incomplete with respect o the set of all 
predicates. | 
Since cardinal incompleteness clearly implies (ordinary) incompleteness, 
we have: 
COROLLARY 2.1. Every inductive procedure is incomplete. 
Intuitively, this result says that an inductive procedure almost always fails, 
in a fairly natural sense of "almost always." This is not quite as distressing as 
it might at first appear to be because there are good reasons for wanting to limit 
induction to predicates that can be expressed by algorithms and the set of all 
these is denumerable. Before we turn to this matter, we briefly explore our 
assumption that a theory can be correct for only a single predicate. 
An inductive procedure (or a machine that implements it) is said to be single- 
valued if every theory that it generates is counted as correct for at most one 
predicate. Most theories of inductive procedures do not require inductive 
procedures to be single-valued. They count a theory, T, as "correct" for any 
predicate that T'S predictions match sufficiently often. What "sufficiently 
often" means can be made precise in many ways. One way is this. We say that 
theory, T, is an n/m sound theory of the predicate, P, if for every m consecutive 
integers that one selects, the values of T and P are the same (for corresponding 
arguments) for at least n of those integers. We call a set of predicates for which 
a given machine generates a theory its n/m scope. We call a machine n/m complete 
(n/m cardinally complete) relative to a set of predicates, W, if its n/m scope 
includes W (has the same or greater cardinality than W). 
INDUCTION, PURE AND SIMPLE 287 
THEOREM 3. There are machines that are n/m cardinally complete with respect 
to the set of all predicates for any n/m < 1. 
Proof. Consider the machine that generates the name of some predicate P
(say the predicate that is everywhere true) no matter what oracle it receives 
as input. Now consider the set of Q, of all predicates that have the same value 
as P for an argument i except where i is evenly divisible by m without remainder. 
For those exceptional i's, the value of the predicates in Q is unrestricted by the 
definition of Q. The set Q has the same cardinality as the set of all predicates. 
To see this, consider the correspondence b tween the set of all predicates and 
the set Q that matches the predicate P with the predicate R (~ Q) if P(i) = Q(m × i) 
for all m and i. This is a one-to-one correspondence which proves the theorem 
since Q is easily seen to be in the n/m scope of M by its definition. I 
Similar theorems can be derived for most ways of defining inductively derived 
theories as correct if they specify "most" values of the subject of the induction 
correctly. Since we do not usually expect our inductively derived theories to 
correctly predict the evidence all of the time and since such many-valued 
procedures have such large scopes, it would seem to make sense to focus our 
attention on them. 
But we will not do so for three basic reasons. The first is that the kind of 
induction machine that aims for n/m soundness and encompasses, in the process, 
such a large scope also has an equally large counterscope. It is not clear that 
the "gain" is worth the corresponding "loss." Our second basic reason for 
focusing on what we might think of as "nonprobabilistic" induction rather than 
"probabilistic" induction is that the former seems to be logically prior to the 
latter in much the same sense in which an event (in the sense in which this 
term is used in probability theory) is logically prior to the probability of that 
event or in much the same sense that, according to Chomsky's account of the 
matter (1965), the study of linguistic competence is logically prior to the study 
of linguistic performance. And our third reason is that attempts to focus on 
probabilistic induction have failed (so far) to solve certain problems and it 
therefore seems to make sense to see whether or not the alternative non- 
probabilistic approach can help to solve these problems (possibly at the expense 
of failing to soIve some others that the probabilistic theories can solve easily). 
6. COMPUTABLE INDUCTION DEFINED 
There are good reasons for requiring inductive procedures to produce theories 
we can use. This suggests that, given a theory T produced by an inductive 
procedure, we should be able to determine ffectively the value of T for an 
arbitrary integer x. If one accepts the Church-Turing thesis, this implies that 
one should limit the theories an inductive procedure may generate to those that 
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are at least partially computable. Let us therefore focus on inductive procedures 
that generate indexes of computable predicates as their theories. 
Where s is a single symbol or finite sequence of symbols, let (s) ~ denote the 
result of concatenating s to itself n times. Let the sequence #(1)~# denote 
the integer n and the sequences #0#,  #1#,  and #2# denote the truth values 
false, true, and undefined, respectively. (This makes the sequence #1 # ambiguous 
but that does not matter here.) A mechanisms, M, is said to compute he truth 
value, v, for the input integer, i, if M, when started with the sequence that 
denotes i on its input tape at time t o (and nothing else except blanks on that 
input tape or any other tape): (a) prints the sequence that denotes v on its 
output tape at some time t~, (b) this sequence is the first sequence beginning 
and ending with # that it prints on the output ape, and (c) for all IDa, j > i, 
IDj-= IDs+ 1 . (The latter condition corresponds to the mechanism's halting 
at time ti since nothing changes after ti .) 
We say that a mechanism M everywhere computes the predicate P if, for all 
positive integers x, it computes the value of P(x) for the input x. We say that 
the mechanism, M, partially computes the predicate P if for all values of P 
that are defined, it computes the value P(x) for the input x and, for the cases 
where P(x) is not defined, it either produces the output #2# (denoting the 
value undefined) or it produces no ouput at all. We say that a predicate is 
everywhere computable if there exists a Turing mechanism that everywhere 
computes it and that it is partially computable if there exists a Turing mechanism 
that partially Computes it. 
We assume that the set of all possible mechanisms has been enumerated by 
enumerating the set of all possible programs in lexicographic order. Let the 
mechanisms in this enumeration be 2141, M2, M3 ,.... Each such mechanism 
partially computes exactly one predicate. Call the predicate partially computed 
by Mi, Pi, and call the integer i an index of this predicate. 
Note that the distinction between predicates that are everywhere computable 
and those that are partially computable differs somewhat from the standard 
distinction between predicates that are totally computable and partially com- 
putable. For example, the predicate that is nowhere defined is partially com- 
putable but not totally computable by the standard efinitions. But it is both 
everywhere computable and partially computable by our definitions. It is 
everywhere computed by a mechanism that always prints #2#,  no matter 
what the input. It is partially computed by this mechanism but also by the 
mechanism that fails to print anything for any input. 
An important result of the theory of computability tells us that there are 
predicates that are partially computable but not everywhere computable. But, 
as we have seen, some predicates are both. For such predicates we distinguish 
those mechanisms that everywhere compute it (indicating the undefined values 
by printing #2#)  and those that only partially compute it (by failing to print 
anything for at least one of these undefined values). We call the index of a 
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mechanism that partially computes an everywhere computable predicate a 
partial index and the index of a mechanism that everywhere computes it a total 
index. Totally computable predicates have only total indexes. 
We call a set of predicates, W, recursively enumerable (or r.e.) if there exists 
some computing machine that computes a sequence of indexes of predicates, 
one at a time, such that an index of every member of W appears at least once 
in the sequence and no index of a predicate that is not in W appears in the 
sequence. 
One of the fundamental results of the theory of computability asserts that 
the set of all totally computable predicates (as these are usually defined) cannot 
be recursively enumerated. The following theorem indicates how our "every- 
where computable" predicates differ from the totally computable ones. 
THEOREM 4. The set of everywhere computable predicates is recursively 
enumer able. 
Pro@ Given any mechanism M that computes a predicate P, we can add 
to its program some instructions that will evaluate the same predicate P that 
the original evaluated except hat, when it evaluates P for the argument x it 
proceeds by first evaluating P(1), then P(2), and so forth, each time evaluating 
P(x @ 1) after evaluating P(x), until it gets to the evaluation of x. We call such 
a procedure the sequential computation of the predicate P. The predicate 
evaluated by the sequential computation of P need not, of course, be P. We 
call this predicate ps. Observe that, whether i is a total or partial index of a 
predicate, the resulting sequential computation must evaluate an everywhere 
computable (possibly partially defined) predicate. This is because, if the original 
M fails to produce an output for any integer i, then the corresponding sequential 
computation fails to do so for all larger integers too. The values of ps beyond 
this "singularity" are therefore all undefined. Thus there exists a mechanism 
that everywhere computes any such predicate, since there are only finitely 
many arguments for which its values are defined. (Such a mechanism can, in 
effect, use a finite list of argument-value pairs that define the finite set of defined 
values, printing #2# for all arguments not found on this list.) 
Clearly one can effectively determine the instructions required to turn a given 
mechanism into one that carries out the corresponding sequential computation 
and one can, therefore, "compute" the index of such a sequential computing 
machine from the index of the original mechanism. Consider the mechanism 
that generates uch indexes for each index in the (given) enumeration of all 
indexes of (partially and everywhere) computable predicates. This mechanism 
generates only indexes of everywhere computable predicates, although often it 
will generate a partial index of such a predicate. But this mechanism will 
generate the index of each everywhere computable predicate at least once 
when it generates the index of the sequentially computing machine from the 
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total index of such a predicate which must exist by definition. And this proves 
the theorem. I 
We will distinguish mechanisms from machines. Intuitively, a mechanism 
can be thought of as representing a physical object of some sort. A machine is 
such a physical object together with some specification of what is to count as 
the output of the mechanism. A given mechanism can, therefore, represent 
several different machines, depending on which aspects of its behavior we think 
of as representing its output. One way of using a mechanism for example, is 
as a computing machine. Using it that way, we count, as its output, the first 
"well-formed" string it generates in response to a given input. It is customary 
to have the mechanism always halt after producing its first output (and com- 
puting centers usually insist on having the programs that people run there halt 
eventually). But if we do not insist on this, a given mechanism can define quite 
a different machine if we say that we will count the second well-formed string 
it prints as its output instead of the first. Probably the most important distinction 
of this sort in this paper is between a mechanism when we count the first output 
string printed as its output and the same mechanism when we count the last 
string printed. 
Induction machines generate indexes of partially computable predicates as 
their theories of input oracles. We say that an induction machine computes 
the index i for the input oracle Op, if, started with 0 e on its input tape (with 
all other tapes blank), it goes through a series of steps and eventually prints 
a sequence denoting the integer i on the output tape (and then never prints 
anything else). If this machine ither fails to print anything or prints the output 
##,  then the value generated by the machine is said to be undefined. It is said 
to be computed undefined if the output is ## and uncomputed undefined otherwise. 
We say that an induction machine is a computing machine if we count, as its 
output for an oracle, the value that it computes. We say that it is a total com- 
puting machine (or TC machine) if it only produces defined values or undefined 
values that are computed undefined and a partial computing machine (or PC 
machine) otherwise. 
A given machine, M, can be used in various ways, depending on what kinds 
of inputs one provides it with. We will use machines both as generators and as 
recognizers. When we use M as a generator, its inputs will be oracles representing 
premises. When we use it as a recognizer, its inputs will be what we call 
"inference tickets" representing inferences. An inference ticket is a sequence 
of the form #(1) c #Op,  representing the inference whose conclusion is the 
predicate whose index is c and whose premises are represented by the oracle Op. 
When we use a machine M as a recognizer, we say that it evaluates a logic LM 
and when we use it as a generator, we say that it evaluates a functional FM . 
Just as we say a generator's output is undefined if it fails to print a full index 
(surrounded by #'s),  so we say that a recognizer's output is undefined if it fails 
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to produce one of the three names of truth values that we recognize (#0#,  
#1# or #2#,  representing the values false, true, and undefined, respectively). 
The functional F M evaluated by the machine M is the functional consisting 
of the pairs ~f, n) such that (f ,  n) ~F M if and only if the value produced by M 
for the oracle of the functionf is the numeral denoting m. The logfcL M evaluated 
by M is the logic that counts as "sound" all inferences represented by inference 
tickets for which M generates the sequence #1# (representing the truth value 
true), false all inferences for which M generates #0#,  and undefined the 
inferences for whose inference tickets M either generates//2# or none of the 
above. 
We call the set of all inferences that Lt4 counts as sound the range of LM. 
The range ofL  M is, in turn, divided into two (disjoint) sets, namely the set of 
inferences that really are sound (where the inference (i, P )  is sound if P -~ Pi) 
and the set of inferences that are not sound. We call the former the scope of L 
and it represents (intuitively) the set of all predicates (or possible worlds) for 
which the inferences that L M classifies as sound really are sound. We call the 
latter the counterscope Of LM and it represents he set of all predicates (or possible 
worlds) for which the inference that L classifies as sound is not sound. 
We will be looking for logics that have scopes that are as broad, or compre- 
hensive, as possible while at the same time having counterscopes that are as 
restricted as possible. We will call a logic complete for a set of predicates S if 
its scope contains exactly one sound inference for each predicate in S, and 
consistent if its scope contains no unsound inference for any predicate in S. 
We call a logic TC if there exists a TC machine that evaluates it and PC if 
there exists a PC machine that evaluates it. We now ask: "What can we say 
about the scopes, consistency and completeness of the computable (TC and PC) 
logics ?" 
7. TOTALLY COMPUTABLE INDUCTION 
Intuitively, the view that the inductive procedures of, say, the scientist or 
the child are representable by TC machines or logics is the view that their 
inductive procedures have the following two properties: 
(1) Given enough evidence, they can generate (or compute) a correct 
theory of that evidence (the values of a predicate) in a finite period of time (at 
the end of which we say something like "Eureka") if they only "think" hard 
enough. 
(2) We can do (1) for every possible set of evidence. 
I think that something like this is the view of Sir Francis Bacon (1949) and it 
figures in the popular account of the process of scientific discovery (at least as 
it is taught in schools). The standard story is that of the scientist working hard 
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in his laboratory to gather enough evidence or sitting and thinking hard enough 
about the evidence already acquired until he finally "discovers" the correct 
theory. Our main results about such procedures Can be stated intuitively by 
saying that if a scientist (or child) can discover the true theory of the evidence 
by a procedure that satisfies conditions (1) and (2), there is a sense in which 
he or she could just as well have "known" the theory before he or she started 
looking. In our terms this is the claim that: 
THEOREM 5. The scope of totally computable logic can contain only finitely 
many predicates. 
Proof. Let the oracle tree (Fig. 2) be the tree (acyclic, rooted, and connected 
graph) whose nodes represent finite sequences on {#, 0, 1, 2} and whose structure 
is defined as follows: 
1. (Root): The root node represents he sequence #. 
2. (Branch): I f  a node represents the sequence S, that node has three 
"son" nodes, one each representing the sequences constructed from S by 
concatenating the symbols 0, 1, and 2 to its right. 
3. (Limitation): The oracle tree has no nodes not required by (t) or (2). 
# 
-#00 #01 #02 #I0 #II #12 #20 #21 #22 
FIG. 2. The  top of an oracle tree. 
The nodes of the oracle tree are called icons, following Peirce (1960). They 
represent all possible finite initial sequences of oracles and hence all possible 
sets of "evidence" from which an induction machine might compute a theory. 
The infinite paths down from the root of this tree trace out oracles by tracing 
out increasingly longer initial segments. It is easy to see that every such infinite 
path represents precisely one oracle and that every oracle is represented by 
such a path. 
Given a TC generator, M, we can associate a starred oracle tree with it as 
follows. Given the machine's operation on each possible oracle, the machine 
may or may not compute a value or theory for that oracle. If it does, it must 
generate an index after having read some finite number of symbols (since it is 
computing). Place a star on the icon tree to the immediate right of the node 
representing the finke inkial sequence of the oracle that M has read when it 
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produces its first output. Clearly, every oracle for which M generates an index 
must have a star somewhere along the path of the starred icon tree of M 
associated with that oracle. I f  M is a total computing machine, then every 
possible path down the tree must have exactly one star on it. If it did not, it 
would represent an oracle for which M computed no output, which is impossible 
since M is assumed to be TC. 
Now recall Koenig's lemma (1936), which asserts that if a finitely branching 
tree has no infinitely long path, it cannot have infinitely many nodes. Consider 
the starred icon tree. Cut it at each star, deleting all descendants of the starred 
node. This cut tree cannot have an infinite path because if it did, that path 
would represent an oracle for which the machine M did not compute a theory, 
which is impossible since we have assumed the tree represents the tree of a 
TC  machine. Therefore, by Koenig's lemma, it can have only finitely many 
nodes. Since the starred nodes are a subset of the finitely many nodes of the 
cut tree there can be only finitely many of them. And, since there is one starred 
node per index generated, M computes only finitely many indexes; therefore 
its scope must be finite. 
The converse of theorem 5 is also true. 
TtIEOREM 6. Every finite set of (totally or partially computable) predicates i " 
the scope of a TC logic. 
Proof. Consider the TC machine, M, that operates in the following way: 
Given a finite initial sequence (or icon) of an oracle O, it compares that sequence 
with the finite initial sequence of all the (finitely many) oracles of members of 
the given set of predicates, IV. I f  the machine M has not yet generated an index, 
and if only one of the oracles of W matches the given icon, the index associated 
with the predicate represented by that oracle is output. If more than one inkial 
segment of an oracle of a predicate in W matches the icon, the next symbol of 
the oracle is read. And, finally, if none of the initial sequences of the oracles 
match the icon, the sequence ##,  the output that represents the computed 
value undefined, is output. 
I f  all the predicates in W are totally computable, then M can generate the 
initial sequences required for the above comparisons from their total indexes 
(which we can assume to be given). I f  W contains some predicates that are 
partially computable but not totally computable (we call such predicates 
"properly partially computable") then M cannot do this. But all it needs then 
is a long enough initial sequence of each of the oracles of predicates in 1V for 
comparison purposes. "Long enough" simply means that enough of an initial 
segment is included so that no two segments are the same over the entire length 
of the shorter of the two. Such a set of initial segments must exist and further- 
more, it can be stored by M in its program. So M exists and is clearly a TC 
machine. It is easy to verify that W is its scope. | 
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Such a machine contains, in some sense, a finite list of possible theories and 
uses the "evidence" only to choose among them. Its use as a model for the 
human mind is thus equivalent o a very strong theory of innate ideas (the 
theory that the ideas we learn from experiences could be in our minds to begin 
with) and it is interesting to note that so strong a theory (which most people 
would probably find distasteful) follows from the requirement for total 
computability (which many would probably find quite natural). 
The fact that the scope of a TC  logic must be finite has a number of fairly 
straightforward consequences, ome of which we now state without proof. 
THEOREM 7. Every TC logic is cardinally incomplete with respect o the set 
of computable predicates. 
COROLLARY 7.1. Every TC logic is incomplete with respect to the set of 
computable predicates. 
THEOREM 8. Evert TC logic is both complete and cardinally complete with 
respect o finitely many sets (namely all the subsets of its scope). 
THEOREM 9. The set of scopes of TC logics is closed under union and inter- 
section but not under complementation with respect o any infinite set of predicates, 
and hence not under complementation with the set of all computable predicates. 
The (infinite) union of all scopes of TC logics is the set of all computable 
predicates. There is, thus, no computable predicate that some TC logic cannot 
successfully "deal with," but (by Theorems 6 and 7) no single machine can 
deal with more than finitely many of them. 
Results comparable to Theorems 5 and 6 apply also to TC generators. 
A totally computable procedure for doing induction with predicates can success- 
fully do induction (by our rather stringent standards) only on finitely many 
predicates. 
But the situation gets somewhat more complicated when we consider logics 
and machines that do induction with functions on the integers. Thus Nau (1975), 
citing Biermann, and also Yasuhara and Bloom (personal communication), 
responding to Kugel (1975), have pointed out the range of a totally computable 
functional can be infinite which implies that the scope of TC  logic can be 
infinite if we take the inputs of such machines as being the values of the function 
over which induction is to be done, in their natural order. If, on the other hand, 
we define machines doing, or recognizing, induction on such functions to take, 
as their inputs, the behaviors of mechanisms computing these functions, one 
can argue (Kugel, 1976) that a counterpart of Theorem 5 applies to induction 
on functions too. 
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8. COMPARING LOGICS 
A given logic can, and indeed must if it is a TC logic, be represented by 
many different machines. We can ask questions about which of these machines 
is "best" (for a given logic) calling one machine "better" than another if it is 
faster or smaller or something like that. We can also ask questions about which 
logic is "best." Depending on how we define "best" we get different kinds of 
questions and, thus, answers. 
As noted above, it makes sense to think of one logic L as somehow "better" 
than another L'  if its scope is larger or if its scope properly includes the scope 
of the other. This suggests two orderings on our logics. We say that L is 
cardinally broader than L' if the cardinality of the scope of L (we write '@(L)" 
for the cardinal number of the scope of L, S(L)) is greater than the cardinalky 
of the scope L '  (or if S(L) > S(L')). We say that L is broader than L'  if the 
scope of L properly includes the scope ofL'  (S(L)C S(L')). We write L GeL '  
if L is cardinally broader than L'  and L'  <b L if L is broader than L'. The fol- 
lowing theorems are easily proved: 
THEOREM 10. The relations <b and <e are transitive, irreflexive, and 
antisymmetric. 
THEOREM 1 1. The set of all totally computable logics has no upper bound under 
either of these orderings. 
We can also define the relations ~b and ~<e as extensions of <b and de  
in the natural way. The relation ~<e is then a complete ordering on the scopes 
of the TC logics in the sense that for any two logics L and L', either L ~<eL' 
or L' ~<eL (or both). But the relation ~<b is not a complete ordering in this 
sense. Neither L'  <~bL nor L ~<bL' needs to hold between two arbitrary TC  
logics L and L'. However, since the intersection and the union of the scopes of 
two TC logics are also scopes of TC logics, two TC logics always have a logic 
that is their greatest lower bound in this ordering (namely the logic whose 
scope is the intersection of their scopes) and one that is their least upper bound 
(namely the logic whose scope is the union of their scopes). By Theorem 6 both 
of these are TC  logics since their scopes are finite. 
Although the ~<b and ~e orderings are potentially useful for comparing 
TC logics, they will not turn out to be useful for comparing logics that are 
not TC logics since non-TC logics all have scopes of the same size: 
THEOREM 12. A logic that is not TC, but whose scope includes only computable 
predicates, always has a denumerably infinite scope. 
Proof. Since the set of computable predicates is only denumerabIe, the 
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scope of a non-TC logic must either be denumerable or finite. But by Theorem 6 
a logic with a finite scope must be a TC logic. | 
This, together with the failure Qf logics to be always comparable with respect 
to the ordering <~b, suggests that we look for other ways to compare logics. 
One natural way is suggested by the thought that when a TC  induction 
machine generates a theory, T, it does so on the basis of an icon I and, in so 
doing, forgoes the chance of computing any more theories for any predicates 
whose oracles have the given icon as their initial segment. This set of predicates 
is precisely the set of predicates whose oracles denote the real numbers in a 
closed interval if we think of oracles as the names of real numbers in base-three 
(ternary) notation with ~¢ serving as the ternary ("decimal") point. One is 
tempted to call a logic L "better" than another logic L' in a given interval if L 
generates more theories in that interval than L'. 
Associating predicates with real numbers suggests a "natural" topology on 
the set of all predicates. Let us say, of the two predicates P and P', that P < P '  
if the real number associated with P (the real number that its oracle represents 
in base-three notation) is smaller than the real number associated with P'. Let 
us say that a predicate Q lies between P and P', and write "Q Bet (P, P') ,"  if 
P < Q < P '  or P '  < Q < P. And finally, let us call one logic L dense in another 
L'  if the scope of L includes the scope of L'  and furthermore, for every two 
predicates P and P '  in the scope of L', there is a predicate in the scope of L 
that lies between them, if such a predicate xists at all. (Such a predicate does 
not always exist since many rational numbers are represented by two predicates 
in our scheme.) 
It is easy to prove: 
THEOREM 13. For every TC logic there is another TC logic that is dense in L. 
Proof. To every logic L there corresponds a machine M that generates the 
index c for the input oracle O if and only if L counts as sound the inference 
ticket consisting of c and O. Consider the machine that is like this M except 
that it "waits" for more symbols of the oracle than M does before it generates c 
and then also generates the two theories at the edges of the interval if possible. 
The construction of such a machine from the given machine M is not always 
effective but such a machine clearly exists. The logic corresponding to this 
machine is both TC  and dense in L. 
We can think of the machine thus constructed as a more cautious version of 
the original that simply waits longer before generating or accepting a theory. 
We call such an extension of a logic or machine a "cautious extension." The 
process of constructing cautious extensions enlarges the scope of a TC  logic 
but no such "enlargement" can include the set of all computable predicates 
because its scope must be finite. 
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Another way of comparing logics is suggested by the thought hat a logic or 
induction machine represents the process by which certain kinds of systems 
can acquire predicates that they can use to govern their behavior. Once a 
predicate has been acquired by such a machine, that system can generate the 
rest of the predicate's oracle. Thus the "complexity" of the oracles a machine 
can acquire represents, in some way, the complexity of the behavior that the 
system can "learn." On the basis of this idea, we might say that the scope of 
a logic is finite-complexity complete if, for every finite sequence, S~, of symbols 
from c~' = {0, 1, 2} there is an oracle, of a predicate P in the scope of L, S(L), 
that contains that sequence as a proper part. 
THEORErvI 14. There is a TC logic that is finite-complexity complete. 
Proof. There are exactly 3 *~ sequences, of length n, on the alphabet ~' 
(which has only three symbols in it). Enumerate the 3 ~ sequences of length n 
in some order (say lexicographical order) and string them together, one after 
the other, in this order. The result of this process is an oracle of a predicate 
which is easily seen to be everywhere computable and contains all finite sequences 
on ~' by construction. Thus, by Theorem 6 there is a TC logic with this predicate 
in its scope which proves the theorem. 11 
Finite-complexity completeness i a rather trivial property of a logic, but 
it represents, in some sense, the ability to acquire sequences of behavior of any 
degree of complexity that can be identified by a finitely long test. An apparently 
less trivial measure of this sort is what we will call "infinite-complexity com- 
pleteness." We say that a logic is infinite-complexity complete, in a set of 
predicates,. S, if for every predicate P ~ S, there is a predicate P '  in S(L) such 
that the oracle of P '  contains (ends in) the (infinitely long) sequence that is 
the oracle of predicate P. 
COROLLARY 14.1. No TC logic can be infinite-complexity complete in the set 
of all totally computable predicates. 
Proof. Since the scope of any TC  logic is finite, the oracles of the predicates 
in that scope cannot contain all the sequences of the form #( l )  n (0)(1) ~ for 
arbitrary n. But all these sequences are the oracles of totally computable 
predicates. | 
We have been discussing ways to compare logics. There are other things one 
can do with logics and machines besides comparing them. One is, of course, 
to use them to actually do induction. There is a sense in which a TC  inductive 
logic or a TC  induction machine defines a procedure that might be used by a 
person, or by a machine, to make inductive inferences. Another thing one might 
use an induction machine for is to describe a particular process used by an 
actual, possibly human, system. If one uses induction machines for this purpose, 
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one may want to determine whether or not a particular machine, M, really 
characterizes a particular, empirically given, procedure. One feature of such 
machines that might be used to help define such experiments is that they 
impose rather natural simplicity orderings on the predicates in their scopes. 
Such simplicity orderings may be more readily susceptible to observation than 
other features of induction machines. 
Given a machine, M, we can define a simplicity ordering on the predicates in 
its scope in terms of the length of "time" it takes, or the number of values of a 
predicate that M needs to see, before M generates an index of the predicate as 
its theory. Thus, we might say that Pi is simpler than P~, relative to the machine 
M, if M generates an index of Pi on the basis of a shorter icon than it requires 
to generate an index of P~. In other words, one theory is simpler than another, 
for a machine M, if M generates the first on the basis of less evidence than it 
requires to generate the second. 
It is clear, however, that one can use a variant on the notion of a cautious 
extension that we mentioned above to alter this ordering almost at will. For 
example, given any TC machine M, we can define another M', with the same 
scope, such that no predicate in the scope of M' is simpler than any other. 
Thus, simplicity of theories (by this account) is relative to the inductive proce- 
dures used to generate them from evidence. 
There are various decision problems associated with the scopes of induction 
machines. The decision problem in S, for the machine M, is the problem: Given 
an index, i, of a predicate, Pi in S, determine whether or not Pi ~ S(M). The 
strong decision problem is the problem: Given an index of Pi, to determine 
whether Pi is in S(M) and also to determine the particular index of Pi that M 
generates for Pi • 
THEOREM 15. The decision problem in S(M) for a TC machine M is not 
reeursively solvable. 
Pro@ Solving this problem, for an arbitrary index of a predicate, P, is 
equivalent to solving the problem of finding all programs that evaluate to one 
of the finitely many predicates in S(L). And this problem is known not to be 
solvable by a computable procedure, even if S(L) contains only a single 
predicate. | 
Since this decision problem for TC machines is not recursively solvable, 
neither is the strong decision problem. 
9. PARTIALLY COMPUTABLE INDUCTION 
A totally computing induction machine has to compute an index for every 
possible oracle it might receive as input. Suppose we relax this requirement 
and allow an induction machine to leave its output uncomputed for one or more 
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oracle inputs. We call any oracle, O, for which a machine, M, never computes 
an index a singularity of M. The following theorem says that we gain quite a lot 
by allowing a machine to have singularities: 
THEOREM 16. There are computing induction machines with only one singularity 
that have infinite scopes. 
Proof. Consider the predicate, P, that is everywhere undefined. (Its oracle 
is the sequence ~(2)°~.) Let M be a machine that has P as its only singularity 
and operates as follows. Whenever it reads the first symbol, s, in its input 
oracle, beyond the initial # ,  that is not the symbol 2, it generates an index of 
the predicate whose oracle is #(2) n (s)% where n is the number of occurrences 
of 2 that M has read up to that point. (n = 0 is allowed.) It is easy to verify 
that: 
(1) There is an effective procedure for computing the required indexes. 
(2) Every index generated adds one predicate to the scope of the machine. 
(3) There are infinitely many indexes generated since, with s =/- symbol 2, 
there are two predicates whose oracles are of the form #(s) n (2) ~ for each 
integer n (one for each s = symbol 1 and s = symbol 0) and M generates the 
correct heory for every predicate that has such an oracle. 
Point (1) implies that M can compute its outputs; (2) and (3) imply that/¢/'s 
scope is infinite. (It is easy to see that P is its only singularity.) This proves 
the theorem. R 
Clearly it did not matter, in the proof of Theorem 16, what predicate we 
used in the role of P as long as it was an everywhere computable predicate (and 
we knew a total index for computing it). We could easily adapt our procedure 
for any such P by simply letting M generate an index of the predicate whose 
oracle is of the form #(S~)(s,~+l)(0) °', where S~ is the sequence consisting of 
the first n symbols of the oracle of P, s~,+l is one of the two symbols in c~ = {0, 1, 2} 
that is different from the (n -- 1)th symbol of the oracle of P, on reading 
#(S,,O(s,~+~ ). This proves: 
COROLLARY 16.1. For any everywhere computable predicate, there is a com- 
puting machine, with that predicate as its only singularity, that has an infinite scope. 
However, it is clear that P, in the proof of Theorem 16, must be an every- 
where computable predicate or else M would not have an effective procedure 
for generating all the required indexes ince it would not have a uniform effective 
procedure for generating the (n -~- 1)th symbol of the oracle of P. 
Recall that an induction machine is called a partially computing induction 
machine or a PC machine if we count, as its output, the index it computes for 
any input oracle and count its outputs as undefined for all the inputs for which 
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it either generates the output ##,  in which case we say that the undefined 
output is computed undefined or it generates no output at all (i.e., it never prints 
a second #),  in which case we say that the "output" is uncomputed undefinedi 
We call a logic a PC logic if there is a PC machine that represents it. 
It follows from these definitions that all TC  machines are also PC machines 
and that all TC logics are also PC logics. However, it follows from Theorem 5 
and Corollary 16.1 that: 
COROLLARY 16.2. There are infinitely many PC logics that are not TC logics. 
It also follows from the fact that TC  logics are PC logics that every finite 
set of computable predicates is the scope of a PC logic and that there is a PC 
logic that is finite complexity complete. We can strengthen the second of these 
facts by: 
THEOREM 17. There is a PC logic that is infinite complexity complete. 
Proof. Consider the machine that generates an index of the predicate whose 
oracle is #(2) n (1)(Rn), where R~ is the oracle if the nth predicate in the enumera- 
tion of all computable predicates for every input icon of the form #(2) ~ (1). 
Clearly this logic computes an oracle that contains every infinite sequence that 
can be contained in the scope of our logics since such oracles must be com- 
putable. Also, clearly, the indexes that it has to generate are easily computed 
so that it is a PC machine. | 
The scopes of TC  logics, being finite, are obviously recursively enumerable 
(by our definition of "recursively enumerable"). Let us call a set of predicates 
recursively enumerable without repetition if there exists a computable numeration 
of ~t set of machine indexes such that exactly one index of each predicate in 
the set appears in the enumeration and no indexes of predicates not in the set 
appear in the enumeration. (Obviously every finite set of computable predicates 
is recursively enumerable without repetition.) 
We call an induction machine consistent if, whenever it generates an index i 
(of a predicate Pi) after reading an icon I of length n (not including the initial #),  
then the first n symbols of the oracle Pi (also not counting the initial #)  are 
the first n symbols of the icon L An inductive logic is consistent if there is a 
consistent machine that evaluates it. We will focus our attention on consistent 
induction machines on the grounds that inconsistency (of this particular kind) 
cannot add any predicates to the scope of the logic that the machine represents 
and is, thus, more or less futile. 
THEOREM 18. The scope of a consistent PC logic is always recursively enumer- 
able without repetition. 
Proof. Consider the enumerating (computing) machine, M, that uses the 
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following procedure. It starts off three copies (or simulations) of the machine 
whose scope is to be recursively enumerated without repetition, one each with 
the input icons #0,  #1,  and #2. It then proceeds to step through a simulation 
of the operations of each of these machines, one step at a time for each simulation 
until one of the three simulations in what we will call its simulation set produces 
an output or shifts the input tape head one square to the right. If one of the 
machines in the simulation set generates an index as output, that index is 
printed out by the machine as an index in the enumeration being generated 
and the simulation that generated that index is removed from the simulation 
set. On the other hand, if a machine in the simulation set shifts its input tape 
head (to the right) then three "copies" of this simulation replace the original in 
the simulation set, with one of each of these simulations reading the symbols 0, 
1, and 2 as the next symbol on its output tape. The process is continued with 
simulations being removed every time they generate an index and being 
"trifurcated" each time they read another input symbol. It stops only if the 
simulation set becomes empty. 
It is clear that the simulation set always contains only finitely many machines 
with finite inputs so that a single machine can simulate them all. It is also easy 
to show that every index that is generated by the original machine, M, is 
generated by some simulation in the simulation set. Furthermore, no predicate 
can possibly have an index placed in the output more than once since every 
predicate whose index is placed in that output sequence differs in at least one 
value from any other predicate whose index is already in the enumeration. 
One of the things that we would like in an induction machine, or in an 
inductive logic, would be completeness with respect o the set of all computable 
predicates. This set constitutes, if one accepts the Church-Turing thesis, the 
set of all theories that one can apply "effectively" in the sense that, given a 
predicate or an oracle to which the theory is to be applied, we can determine 
in a mechanical way what the theory says of that thing. But it is easy to see that: 
THEOREM 19. No PC induction machine (or logic) can be complete with 
respect to the set of computable predicates or even the set of everywhere computable 
predicates. 
Proof. Consider an arbitrary everywhere computable predicate P and a 
purportedly complete induction machine M. Either P is in the scope of M or it 
is not. If it is not, M cannot be complete, so assume that it is in the scope of M. 
This means that after reading some number n of symbols of the oracle of P, 
M generates a correct theory of P. Consider the predicate P '  that differs from 
P only in the fact that, if P(n q- 1) is true then P'(n + 1) is false and otherwise 
P(n + 1) is true. Obviously P '  is everywhere computable since P is and it 
differs from it in only one value. But P '  is not in the scope of M because, in 
dealing with P', M generates an index of P and P '  @ P. 
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Theorem 16 implies that: 
THEOREM 20. A PC logic can be cardinally complete with respect o the set of 
all computable predicates. 
What we might intuitively think of as a "properly" PC logic (i.e., one that 
cannot be represented by a TC machine) must be cardinally complete with 
respect o this set by Theorem 6. 
It is natural to ask whether the converse of Theorem 17 is also true. It is 
not, for there are sets of computable predicates that are recursively enumerable 
without repetition that are not the scopes of PC logics. A proof of this fact can 
be found in Kugel (1973). 
We call a predicate, P, consistent with an icon, l, of length, n, if the first n 
symbols of I are identical to the first n symbols of the oracle of P. Note that 
there is a nondenumerable s t of predicates consistent with any given icon, 
and the cardinality of this set of predicates is precisely the cardinality of the 
set of all predicates. Since a computing machine that generates a single index, i, 
on the basis of an icon, /, must generate that same index for every predicate 
consistent with that icon, we have: 
THEOREM 21. Every computing machine that generates at least one index 
generates the wrong index for as many predicates as there are predicates altogether. 
Recall that the counterscope of a logic is the set of all predicates for which 
the logic generates an incorrect index. Theorem 20 implies: 
COROLLARY 21.1. The counterscope of every computable logic whose scope is 
not empty has the cardinality of the set of all predicates. 
and: 
COROLLARY 21.2. The counterscope of a computable logic is larger (has a 
larger cardinal number) than the scope of such a logic except when both the scope 
and the counterscope are empty. 
(Intuitively, this says that computable logics are "wrong" more often than 
they are "right.") Notice that PC logics can be dense in themselves, unlike 
TC logics. (Again we leave the proof to the reader.) Let us call a predicate P
a limit point of a logic if, for every predicate P '  in the scope of the logic, there is 
another predicate Q in the scope such that Q Bet (P', P). PC logics cannot 
contain their own limit points. 
The main "advantages" ofPC logics thus seem to be that: (1) They can have 
infinite scopes. (2) They can be infinite complexity complete. (3) They can 
have scopes that are dense in themselves. And (4), when they give results they 
do so with the finality of a computation. Their main disadvantage can be 
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summarized by saying that they give the wrong results more often then they 
give the right ones (if they give any results at all). 
10. UNCOMPUTABLE LOGICS 
Computable logics do not look very "good." Our results seem to suggest 
that they have few merits and if pure inductive logics had to be computable, this 
paper probably would not have been worth writing. But they do not have to 
be--even if we assume that induction must somehow be carried out by the 
kind of machine we call a "computer." For although Turing machines are the 
standard models for what computers can do, there are ways we can get a com- 
puting machine to evaluate uncomputable functions that Turing machines 
cannot compute. 
Once we do use such more powerful machines, albeit with the same machinery, 
we can develop inductive logics that seem to allow us to solve, or at least avoid, 
two traditional problems that stand in the way of a satisfactory logical theory. 
We call these problems "Hume's problem" and "Peirce's problem." 
Roughly speaking, Hume's problem is "How do we know that a pure inductive 
inference generates a theory that is true in this particular world in which its 
premises are true (since it does not seem to generate a theory that will be true 
in all worlds in which its premises are true) ?" And Pierce's problem is "Even 
if we were sure that our methods only made sound inferences, how do we know 
that these methods will generate inferences that will be useful to us in this 
world ?" We will deal with Hume's problem first. 
The parenthetical remark in our statement of Hume's problem is the content 
of what we have called Hume's theorem (*Theorem 1). But Hume's problem 
can, to some extent at any rate, be solved by simply noting that even pure 
induction can generate conclusions that must be true in this world because, 
like deductive conclusions, they must be true in all possible worlds in which 
their premises are. 
What went wrong with our attempted "proof" of what we called "Hume's 
*theorem" was that we assumed that the information given at any given time t i 
was the same thing as the premises of the induction. From this we inferred 
that, since the inference went beyond the information given at the time ti (for 
some i) it also went beyond the premises P. But suppose that the premises of 
an induction not only are not all given but cannot be all given (in finite time) 
because there are infinitely many of them. Let us continue to assume that we 
are dealing with simple (and pure) induction. A case of such induction has, 
as its subject, a predicate Q on the integers. Suppose that the premises of that 
inference are (as we have been implicitly assuming they were) all the values 
of Q, given to our machines by the oracle of Q. An inductive inference then 
still goes beyond the information given at any finite time. But suppose we 
304 PETER KUGEL 
allow the inference to take infinitely many premises ? A deductive inference 
cannot take infinitely many premises and one way looking at Goedel's Com- 
pleteness Theorem for the first-order predicate calculus is to say that it shows 
that one does not have to. 
According to the account of inductive inferences developed by Putnam (1962, 
1965) and Gold (1965, 1967), one can allow such inferences to take account of 
infinitely many premises without taking infinitely long to do it. The way that 
they manage this is roughly comparable to the way that a Turing machine 
can take advantage of an infinite tape without ever having to write infinitely 
much except in those cases where it is not producing any results. 
Let us call a logic L a Humean logic if it accepts, as sound, at least one inference 
that is unsound in some possible world and a Leibnitzian logic if it is not Humean 
(and its scope is not empty). It was Leibnitz (1956) who, writing before Hume 
posed his problem, suggested that one could put the theory of inductive 
inference on the same solid ground as the grounds he had found for the theory 
of deduction. Inductive inferences could be analytic like deductive ones, 
Leibnitz agreed, because their conclusions too could be "contained" in their 
premises. Demonstrating this containment, Leibnitz suggested, required an 
analysis "in the limit," much like the kind of analysis that Leibnitz had used 
as the basis for the calculus. In the next few sections we consider this suggestion 
from a modern point of view (eschewing Leibnitz theological embellishments, 
which have made his theory so unpalatable). 
Peirce made the same suggestion that Leibnitz did but he also asked another 
question. Fine, he said, suppose that we find that induction leads to sound 
conclusions from sound premises. How do we know that any particular inductive 
procedure will make those inferences that we need ? We might feel confident 
that such inferences will be forthcoming from an induction machine if that 
machine generates all possible sound inferences. Let us call a machine that 
does this complete. We will show that, if we allow ourselves to use machinery 
that is just slightly more powerful than what we need for constructing Leibnitzian 
logics, then we can generate machines that are complete in this sense and solve 
Peirce's problem. [Peirce's problem was discussed by Peirce (1960) and revived 
by Chomsky (1968), who, unfortunately, attributed it to an essay Peirce never 
wrote.] 
11. N-TRIAL INDUCTION 
We say that a mechanism is an n-trial machine (Putnam, 1965) if we count, 
as its output for the input x, the last #-surrounded sequence that it prints on 
its output tape if it prints n or fewer such sequences, or the nth one if it prints 
more than n such sequences. If this output is the sequence ## (the empty 
#-surrounded sequence) then the output of the machine is said to be computed 
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undefined. If  the machine never prints an output for the input x then its output 
is said to be uncomputed undefined for this input. 
Let us use the word mapping to talk about predicates, functionals indifferently. 
It is easy to verify that: 
THEOREM 22. The 1-trial machines evaluate precisely the mappings that the 
PC machines do. 
We call a mapping an n-trial mapping (predicate, function, or functional) if 
there is an n-trial machine that evaluates it. It is also easy to see that: 
THEOREM 23. Every n-trial mapping is also an (n + 1)-trial mapping. 
The converse of Theorem 23 is false: 
THEOREM 24. For all nonnegative integers, n, there is an (n + 1)-trial mapping 
that is not an n-trial mapping. 
Proof. (We prove this theorem for the case of predicates only.) Our enumera- 
tion of all the "Turing mechanisms" defines an enumeration of all the n-trial 
predicates (for a given n) if we associate, with each mechanism in the enumera- 
tion, the predicate P that it evaluates when we think of it as an n-trial machine. 
Consider the stepping routine that operates as follows. Given the arguments 
i, j, k, and n, it "simulates" the operation of the mechanism 34 i (the ith 
mechanism in our enumeration of the mechanisms) on the input j for k steps. 
If, at precisely the kth step in its operation, M i completes the printing of a 
value y on its output tape (by wrking an appropriate #)  and if this is the nth 
value that Mi has printed for the given input then the subroutine produces 
the value y. Otherwise it produces the output #.  This subroutine evaluates 
the function s(i, j, k, n) whose value is precisely the value y that 2FIi(j) produces 
at step k if this is the nth value that it has produced and # otherwise. It is easy 
to see that this function is totally computable. 
Given this subroutine, we define a diagonal machine that, for any given n, 
evaluates a predicate that is not an n-trial predicate. This machine operates as 
follows. Given an input x, it begins by printing out the sequence denoting the 
truth value "false." It then turns control over to the stepping routine that 
steps through the computation, l]//x(x ) of the xth machine in the enumeration 
(M~) for the argument x with the step value (n) equal to 1. If 2/I~(x) produces a
first value, the stepping routine will give this value as its result and our diagonal 
machine will print the sequence that denotes the complement of that value (the 
value "true" if the value given was "false" or "undefined" and the value "false" 
if the value given was "true"). It then runs the stepping routine with the same 
arguments except that now it will increase n by 1 and ask for the second value 
produced by M~(x). If  a value is forthcoming, the diagonal machine will print 
643/35/4-4 
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its complement and continue in this manner, printing out the complement of 
the nth value produced and then asking the stepping routine to get the (n @ 1)th 
value produced for Mx(x). 
The predicate valuated by this machine, taken as an (n -r 1)-trial machine, 
cannot be an n-trial predicate for suppose that it was. It would, then, occupy 
a specific place in our enumeration of all the n-trial predicates. But it cannot 
be the zth position. Because, if it were, it would produce a value for z that was 
different from the value of P~(z). To see this, consider the three possible cases: 
(1) Suppose that M~(z) never produces any values. Then the evaluated 
predicate is undefined but the predicate valuated by our diagonalizing machine 
is false. 
(2) Suppose that M~(z) produces fewer than n values, say m. Then the 
(m @ 1)th value produced by our diagonal machine for z as input is different 
from the last (mth) value produced by M z for that input. 
(3) Suppose that M~(z) produces n values. Then the (n-~ 1)th value 
produced by the diagonalizing machine is different from this value and it, too, 
is the value generated by our diagonal machine treated as an (n @ 1)-trial 
machine. 
Since the diagonal machine produces a different value (as an (n Jr 1)-trial 
machine) for each possible z, the predicate it evaluates is distinct from the 
zth n-trial machine for at least he value generated for z. Note that, incidentally, 
that the diagonal mechanism is the same, no matter what the n whose n-trial 
predicates we are using to diagonalize. Thus it (n -t- 1)-trial computes a different 
predicate for each n and that (n q- 1)-trial predicate is not n-trial. | 
As an example of how an increase in n increases the power of the n-trial 
machine, consider the following: 
THEOREM 25. The halting problem for PC machines can be solved by a 2-trial 
machine but not by a 1-trial machine. 
Proof. By Theorem 22, the 1-trial machines are precisely the traditional 
Turing machines. Turing (1936) has proved that such machines cannot solve 
the halting problem for PC machines. To prove the other part of the theorem, 
consider the machine that operates as follows. Given the input (i,j) which we 
take to express the question "Does a machine M.~, operating on the input j, 
ever halt ?", this machine begins by printing out the answer "no." It then runs 
(a simulation of) M~(j), step by step, and if this simulation halts at some step, 
say the kth, the machine prints out the value "yes." It is clear that the last 
answer this machine prints out is the right answer to the question "Does Mi(j) 
halt ?" and that this answer cannot be more than the second answer it prints 
out. Therefore, this machine is a 2-trial machine that solves the halting 
problem. | 
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n-Trial machines (for the case n > 1) require, in some sense, uncomputably 
long (although still finitely long) periods of time to complete their evaluations. 
It is easy to see that one cannot, in general, compute the length of time (or 
number of steps) that it requires for an n-trial machine to generate its (proper) 
output, because if one could, then one could reduce that machine to a 1-trial 
machine and this, in turn, is impossible by Theorem 24. Thus, n-trial machines 
(for n > 1) are, in some sense, generalizations of the idea of a computing 
machine much as the computing (or Turing) machines are generalizations of 
the finite automata. The computing machines (or Turing machines) are finite 
automata that can use arbitrary amounts of space, whereas the n-trial machines 
are computing machines that can use arbitrarily (not necessarily computably) 
long periods of time. 
Such machines differ from computing machines in a variety of ways. When 
they produce an output we do not always know (unless it is the nth output) 
that the output they are producing is the output that will "count" or not. 
n-Trial machines will, eventually, "know" the value o f  the predicate P for art 
argument x that they are evaluating (or the theory T that they are generating) 
but they will not always "know that they know." If one were to run an n-trial 
procedure on a computer, one might get one's output and then, a few weeks 
later, get a phone call from the computing center to inform one that a new 
output was on the way because the computing machine had "changed its mind." 
Such evaluations would be annoying for the user of the computer and they 
would be annoying for the director of the computing center because there 
would be situations in which he would have to keep a program running forever. 
However, when we are trying to model human induction, these problems are 
not quite as serious. The fact that we do not know (with finality) that we know 
something is simply another way of saying that we are keeping our minds open. 
And the point that we do not stop thinking about one problem when we turn 
to the next is not as distressing when made about people as it is when we are 
talking about computing machines. 
Since we can easily turn an n-trial machine into an equivalent (n + 1)-trial 
machine by simply counting outputs and halting the machine whenever it 
prints its nth output, we have: 
THEOREM 26. An n-trial mapping is also an (n @ 1)-trial mapping and hence 
all PC mappings are also n-trial mappings for all n >/ 1. 
Hence, our positive results about PC logics carry over to n-trial logics (n ~> 1). 
Some negative results do too. Thus we have: 
THEOREM 27. For any n, the scope of an n-trial logic cannot be dense in the 
set of computable oracles. 
Proof. Suppose there were an n-trial logicL that was dense in itself. Consider 
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the oracle tree and, as in the proof of Theorem 5, label each node at which a 
theory was generated. If  L is dense in itself, then the descendant of each node 
with two labeled branches would have (by induction) an infinity of labels on its 
descendants. But by Koenig's lemma, this would imply that it had at least one 
infinitely labeled branch, which is impossible, because any branch can have, 
at most, n labels by the definition of "n-trial." | 
THEOREM 28. An n-trial logic can be Leibnitzian but if it is, it must have a 
finite scope. 
Proof. To see how an n-trial logic can be Leibnitzian, consider a 2-trial 
logic whose scope contains only the predicate that is everywhere true and whose 
oracle is #(1) ~. Let it generate some index of this predicate as its first trial 
and then the pseudoindex ## (representing the computed undefined "index") 
whenever it reads, from its input oracle, a symbol other than 1. This logic is 
clearly Leibnitzian. 
To see that any such logic can have only a finite scope, assume it does not. 
Then its icon tree must have an infinitely labeled path (since, by Koenig's 
lemma, it has infinitely many labeled nodes): But this is impossible by the 
definition of "n-trial" because no path can have more than n labels. | 
COROLLARY 28.1. For any n and m (n < 1), there is a Leibnitzian n-trial 
logic with a scope of size m. 
Proof. For example, to see that a 2-trial logic can have a scope of size 3 j, 
consider the logic that generates the theory whose oracle is #S(1)% where S 
is any sequence on ~' = {0, 1, 2} of length j immediately after reading S (and no 
other theories before that). And let it then generate the undefined theory whose 
"index" is ## whenever it reads a 0 or 2 after that. This logic clearly has the 
desired properties. Now note that (a) we can easily cut the scope down to any 
size less than 3 j by having it print ## instead of some indexes, and (b) a 2-trial 
machine is also an n-trial machine for n > 2 if we simply have it stop after 
generating its second output. | 
Leibnitzian logics are appealing on philosophical grounds because, for them, 
Hume's  version of "the" problem of induction ("How can we justify induction 
if it does not lead to conclusions that must be true if the premises from which 
they are derived are true ?") does not arise. But logics with finite scopes have 
a serious drawback. They represent systems equivalent to systems with "innate 
ideas," systems that could have started off "containing" the finite set of indexes 
they can acquire. 
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12. LIMITING COMPUTABLE INDUCTION 
We now turn to logics that can be Leibnitzian and have infinite scopes. We 
call a mechanism a trial-and-error machine [the term "trial and error" is due 
to Putnam (1965)] if its output, for the input x, is defined to be the last integer 
it computes, or, to be more precise, if its output is: 
(1) The last output the machine computes if it computes a last output. 
(2) Undefined if the machine does not produce a last output because it 
either produces infinitely many outputs or none. 
Again, we observe that there are two kinds of situations in which the mapping 
that such a machine evaluates can be undefined. It can be undefined by an 
application of clause (2), in which case we call it uncomputed undefined or it can 
be undefined as a result of clause (1) because the machine prints the sequence ## 
as its last output, in which case we say that it is computed undefinedi We call 
a mapping a limiting computable or LC [the term "limiting computable" is 
based on Gold (1965)] if there exists a trial-and-error machine that evaluates it. 
The same argument that we used to prove Theorem 26, shows that: 
THEOREM 29. All n-trial mappings are also LC mappings. 
And, again, the converse of this theorem is false: 
THEOREM 30. There are LC mappings that are not n-trial mappings for any 
integer n (n > 0). 
We omit the proof. We call a logic a limiting computable logic (or LC logic) 
if there exists a trial and error machine that represents it. It follows from 
Theorem 29 that: 
COROLLARY 30.1. There are LC logics that are not n-trial logics. 
The limiting computable mappings fit into a natural hierarchy usually called 
the Arithmetic Hierarchy, with the TC and PC mappings. In general, we call 
the class of TC mappings Z0,  the class of PC mappings Z 1 , and the class of 
LC mappings 272 . These 27 classes are familiar objects from recursion theory. 
They provide a rather natural basis for classifying inductive procedures, but 
before we can use them for this purpose, we need to develop some facts about 
them. We begin by defining the Z' and H classes of the Arithmetic Hierarchy. 
Consider the predicates P such there exists a definition of P of the form: 
ni+l[x X) p(x)  ~ (Qlx~)(O2x,) ... (Oixi) ~ t 2, x2 . . . . .  x i ,  
such that R~ +~ is an (i + 1)-place totally computable predicate and the (Qjxj) 
are alternating existential and universal quantifiers. Then ~j is the class of all 
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predicates definable in the above form with j quantifiers, the first of which is 
existential. Thus, for example, 278 contains all predicates expressible in the 
form (91xl) (9~x~)(93x3)R,4(x l ,  x~, x3, x) with totally computable R, 4 and 
with Q1 being 3. //j is the set of all predicates expressible in the above form 
with j quantifiers, the first of which is universal. 
Allowing the use of more (alternating different) quantifiers expands the set 
of predicates thus definable. This is the content of the important Arithmetic 
Hierarchy Theorem due to Kleene (1943) and Mostowski (1947): 
THEOREM (Arithmetic Hierarchy Theorem). For alln: X n C Zn+l, H~ C 17,+1, 
and for n > O, 17, :/: Z ,  . 
Proofs can be found in Kleene's or Mostowski's original papers, or in any 
one of a variety of texts in recursion theory, including those of Rogers (1967) 
and Schoenfeld (1967). Moving up either the Z i or the H, classes of this 
hierarchy not only expands the set of predicates, but also adds new predicates 
that are, in a certain natural sense, "less computable" than any of those in the 
previous et. 
A cleaner (but equivalent) definition of this hierarchy is possible in terms 
of what we might call "Z quantifiers" and "T/quantifiers." If we defined "(Zx)" 
as short for "--(~x)" and "(//x)" as short for "(Vx)--" (for arbitrary x), then 
X, becomes the set of predicates definable in terms of totally computable 
predicates with the use of n 27 quantifiers and 17, becomes the class of predicates 
definable in terms of totally computable predicates using n 17 quantifiers. 
Another intuitively appealing characterization f the Arithmetic Hierarchy is 
possible in terms of the repeated applications of Gold's (1965) limit operator 
(Schubert, !974; Criscuolo et al., 1975). 
We will associate, with some of the classes Of ~his hierarchy, machines definable 
in terms of the basic Turing mechanism that can evaluate all predicates in this 
class. It turns out that, although we will notpursue th e matter in its full generality 
here, one can think of the machines to evaluate predicates in Z n as machines 
that have available to them infinite amounts of time in (n -- 1) dimensions. 
~ATe will deal only with one- and two-dimensional (potentially) infinite time in 
this paper. But it is interesting that, although Turing mechanisms cannot 
enlarge their scope by adding more than one dimension of infinity to their 
available space, they can expand it by (in some sense) adding dimensions to the 
available time. 
It is clear that Z 0 is precisely the class of totally computable predicates. This 
follows from the definition. Our stepping routine can be used to show that 271 
contains precisely the predicate s that can be evaluated by PC machines. And 
Putnam (1965) and Gold (1965) have shown that: 
THEOREM 31. The predicates that can be evaluated by LC machines are 
precisely the predicates in Z 2 . 
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The main point of this theorem, from our point of view, is that it relates 
the trial and error predicates, and the LC logics they represent, o other kinds 
of predicates and logics about which a good deal is already known and whose 
relationships to other kinds of logics and formalizations are relatively well 
understood. 
Relations between formally defined predicates and intuitively given procedures 
are asserted by theses rather than theorems. Unlike theorems, theses are not 
subject to mathematical proof because one side of the claimed equivalence is
given informally and only loosely defined. Two well-known theses relate 
predicate classes to inferential procedures: 
THESIS 1 (Church, 1936; Turing, 1936). The processes that we consider, 
intuitively, to be computable are precisely those that are representable by predicates 
in Z o . 
THESIS 2 (Kleene, 1943). The systems we consider to be axiomatizable are 
precisely those whose sets of theorems are representable as the range of a predicate 
in 21 . 
We shall suggest hat induction is probably best placed in Z 2 or Z 3 . If this 
claim is substantiated (and it is important o recognize the fact that it cannot 
be proved) and if one also accepts the theses stated above (as I do), then it 
follows that induction is beyond the scope of computation and axiomatizability. 
We will return to this matter later. 
13. LEIBNITZIAN AND NEWTONIAN INDUCTION 
Recall that a logic is Leibnitzian if it accepts, as sound, only inferences in 
which the conclusions must be true whenever the premises are. PC and TC 
logics cannot be Leibnitzian if they deal with pure inductive inferences of the 
type we have been discussing. Let us extend this definition to generators or 
induction machines by calling a machine M Leibnitzian if it never generates an 
incorrect heory for any input oracle and it generates at least one theory (for 
some oracle). Probably the main reason for preferring logics and machines 
whose power is representable by predicates in Z~ (i.e., the LC logics and 
machines) is given by the following: 
THEOREM 32. LC machines can be Leibnitzian and have infinite scopes when 
doing pure induction. 
Pro@ Consider the machine that (1) never generates a theory (by generating 
its index) unless that theory is consistent with the evidence obtained up to 
that point, and (2) once a theol T is adopted, drops it if and only if that theory 
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is falsified by the evidence. As long as such a machine only generates every- 
where (and preferably totally) computable indexes, and strictly follows the 
precepts outlined above, it cannot limiting compute a false theory. And it is 
easy to see that there is a machine of this sort that generates at least one theory. 
To see that such a machine can have infinite scope, consider the procedure 
that starts off by generating an index of the everywhere true predicate and, if 
and only if, at any time, its current heory is disproved by the available vidence, 
represented by the segment r of the oracle read up to that time, it generates 
an index of the predicate whose oracle is #r(1) ~. (Clearly, there is a machine 
that can always generate this index, given r.) This machine, as a trial-and-error 
machine, obeys (1) and (2) and hence is Leibnitzian. It has every predicate 
whose oracle is of the form #S(1) ~ (where S is any finite sequence on 
cd= {0, 1, 2}) in its scope. Thus its scope is infinite, which completes the 
proof of the theorem. | 
We call the property expressed by (1) veracity and the property expressed 
by (2) tenacity. These properties of logics and machines are related to, but are 
not identical to, Newton's first and fourth principles of philosophizing (or 
doing science). Let us now define them somewhat more precisely. To do this, 
we introduce the notion of the hypothesizing function associated with machine M. 
A hypothesizing function maps icons (initial segments of oracles) to indexes. 
Given a trial and error machine M that represents a logic, L, we define a 
hypothesizing function associated with M, which we call h, or hM, as follows. 
Given an icon, r~, consisting of n symbols (not including the initial #); h(r,~) 
is the last index generated by M at the point at which it shifts its input tape 
head to the symbol after the nth (which is to say it has finished reading it and 
is ready to read the next symbol of its oracle), h(r,) is undefined under any of 
the following circumstances: 
(1) M shifts its input tape head to the right without ever having generated 
an index, after reading r~. 
(2) M never shifts the input tape head to the right after reading rn or 
some initial segment of r,~, possibly because it gets into a nonterminating "loop" 
or because it terminates its operations without ever generating an index or 
shifting the input tape after reading n symbols. 
(3) The index generated by M after reading r,~ (and shifting the input 
tape head one square to the right) is the "undefined" index ##.  
We denote the first n symbols of the oracle Rp by re, ~ . hM(rp,~ ) is the last 
index generated by M after seeing the first n values of P. We denote the oracle 
of this predicate by HM(re: ) and the first k symbols of this oracle by HM,~(rp,~). 
We call a machine M, veracious if the index hM(re,.) that it generates after 
seeing the first n symbols of the oracle of P is the index of a predicate P~ that 
has the same values as P for the first n integers. We call a machine tenacious 
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if it does not generate anew index unless some symbol that it has read is different 
from the corresponding symbol of the oracle of the predicate whose index it 
has generated (i.e., it sticks to a hypothesis until it is disconfirmed by the 
evidence). 
This defines tenacity and veracity for machines. We say that a logic is tenacious 
(or veracious) if there exists a machine that represents it that is tenacious (or 
veracious). We call an LC logic, L, full if there exists a machine, M, that repre- 
sents it and whose hypothesizing function is nowhere (i.e., for no icon) undefined. 
Intuitively, such a logic has a theory for every possible set of evidence (given 
in our standard order for presenting such evidence). I f  this nowhere undefined 
hypothesizing function is also tenacious and veracious, we call such a logic 
saturated. 
THEOREM 33. The scope of a saturated logic is everywhere dense. 
Proof. Consider any two predicates P and P '  such that P < P '  and such 
that there is a predicate between them. It follows, from the fact that P < P',  
that there is a lest n such that the nth symbol of the oracle of P is less than the 
nth symbol of the oracle P '  (in the ordering 0 < 1 < 2). Suppose that the nth 
symbol of the oracle of P is 0 and the nth symbol of P '  is 1 (the remaining case 
can be treated similarly). Consider the predicate whose index M generates for 
the icon re,~l (re,~ followed by 1). Either this is the predicate whose oracle is 
re,~(l) ~ or it is not. I f  it is, and this is not the oracle of P, then this predicate 
is the required predicate between P and P' .  I f  this is the oracle and also it is 
the oracle of P, then the predicate whose oracle is re,~(0) °~ cannot be P '  since 
if it were, P and P '  would have no predicate between them. Therefore, there 
must be some n' such that the oracle of P '  differs from the oracle of this latter 
predicate in the n'th position. M must generate an index for the icon 
re',~ = (0) (~'-~) and any continuation of this oracle lies between P and P'. 
A similar construction is possible for the nth symbols of P and P '  for any n. | 
We will focus on machines that are both tenacious and veracious. They are 
easy to handle mathematically and they seem to be reasonable models for 
induction as the scientist practices it. It is hard to see any particular merit in 
having a machine avoid tenacity by essaying a new theory when an old one 
covers the available evidence (although one can think of reasons for replacing 
such a theory with a more elegant heory) or having it avoid veracity by putting 
forth a theory that had already been disproved (although one can think of 
reasons for having it put forth a theory that is not i00 % confirmed by the 
available vidence). 
We call a machine that is both tenacious and veracious Newtonian (since 
two of Newton's principles of philosophizing are involved). Newtonian machines 
run into difficulties when they try to maintain the "virtues" of veracity and 
tenacity in the face of properly partially computable predicates. The difficulty 
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lies in this. Suppose that a Newtonian machine M generates a theory T and it 
comes to a value, x, such that T(x) is uncomputed undefined for the only 
index of T it knows. When it determines the value of the predicate, P, that is 
the subject of the induction, it is faced with the following dilemma. Either it 
assumes that T(x) is the same value as P(x), in which case it can guarantee 
tenacity by not issuing a new theory, or it assumes that T(x) is a value different 
from P(x) and it guarantees veracity by issuing a new (consistent) theory. But 
in either case, if it is wrong in its assumption, it finds itself having tried to 
maintain one virtue and forgoing the other. I f  the theory generated, T, is a 
properly partially computable predicate, then this must happen for any index 
of T for some x (and, indeed, infinitely many x's). Newtonian machines that 
have the temerity to set forth partially computable theories can thus get stuck 
and generate the same theory for all the predicates in a nondenumerable s t of 
predicates and that theory can be correct for only one predicate. Given two 
predicates P and P' such that P ~ P', we call the set of all predicates, P", 
such that P ~ P" ~ P' the interval associated with P and P' .  I f  the scope of a 
machine M includes no predicates at all in the interval associated with P and P' 
then we say that the interval is a gap of M. It is easy to see that, if there exists 
any interval with only finitely many predicates in the scope of a machine, then 
that machine has at least one gap and if a machine has any gap at all it has 
infinitely many. A Newtonian machine either includes some properly partially 
computable predicate in its scope or it does not. I f  it does not, then it cannot 
be complete with respect o the set of all computable predicates ince some of 
them are properly partially computable. If it does, then it has a gap and therefore 
its scope leaves out all the predicates in that gap (which obviously includes 
computable predicates). So we have proved that: 
TI~EOREM 34 (Putnam, 1962). A Newtonian machine 
complete with respect to the set of all computable predicates. 
We have also proved that: 
or logic cannot be 
THEOREM 35. I f  a Newtonian Logic contains a properly partially computable 
predicate in its scope, then its counterscope contains nondenumerably many predicates. 
Since a logic is Leibnitzian if and only if its counterscope is empty, this 
implies: 
COROLLARY 35.1. A Newtonian logic, whose scope contains even one properly 
partially computable predicate, cannot be Leibnitzian. 
LC logics do not have to be Newtonian to be incomplete. Thus Putnam (1962) 
has presented a straightforward iagonal argument o show that any logic that 
generates, as its theories, only totally computable predicates, cannot be complete 
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with respect o the totally computable predicates. Gold has shown that matters 
are not helped if we allow partially computable predicates to be generated: 
THEOREM 36 (Gold, 1965). Any LC logic must be incomplete with respect to 
the totally computable predicates and hence with respect to the computable predicates. 
Proof. Let L be a purportedly complete logic and let M be a machine that 
corresponds to it. Run two versions of M, running the first one step and then 
the second one step so that, after 2n steps, each one has been run n steps. Into 
the first, feed a sequence of l's on its input tape (as required to keep up with 
the input tape head) and into the second, feed a sequence of O's until one version 
or the other generates ome index. If this never happens, then neither the 
predicate that is everywhere true (and whose oracle is #(1) °') nor the predicate 
that is everywhere false is in the scope of L and both of these predicates are 
totally computable. If it does happen, take the first machine that generated an 
index and throw away the other. Now start two copies of the remaining machine 
(from the point where we left it) and now feed the l's into one (via its input 
tape) and the O's into the other as needed, starting from where the sequence 
already on the tape stopped. Again, one or the other generates a new index or 
neither does. If neither does, then one of the two predicates whose oracle is 
generated by continuing the given sequence with an infinity of O's or l's on 
the input tape is not in the scope of L because L has generated only a single 
index for both. If  an index is generated by one, start the process again as before. 
Continuing this process endlessly (if necessary) we generate (on the input 
tape) the oracle of a computable (and everywhere defined) predicate for which L 
generates an infinity of indexes, each different from the preceding one so that 
it does not "converge" to any index for that predicate. | 
COROLLARY 36.1. Any LC logic is incomplete with respect o the everywhere 
defined, computable predicates. 
THEOREM 37. The scope of a Newtonian logic is always recursively enumerable 
without repetition. 
Proof. Let L be the Newtonian logic whose scope is to be recursively 
enumerated and let M be a trial-and-error machine that corresponds to it. 
Consider the enumerating procedure that begins by running one version of M 
a step at a time. Every time one of its versions of M shifts its input tape head 
one square to the right (to read another symbol), our procedure generates two 
additional copies of M with the input at that time and adds them to those 
already at hand. Our procedure then places a 0, a 1 and a 2 on the now-scanned 
square of the input tape of each of the (now) three copies of M with that input. 
As this procedure continues (generating copies of M, but always having only 
finitely many in hand), let the procedure generate the index output by any 
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of the copies of M it is running (we assume ach is run one step at a time) when 
it is generated as the ith value of the function it is evaluating, starting with 
i = 1 and increasing i every time a new index is generated. Since M is tenacious 
and veracious, it cannot generate two different indexes of the same predicate. 
The scope of M is infinite if and only if our procedure generates infinitely many 
indexes and hence either this procedure recursively enumerates the scope of L 
without repetition, or the scope is finite, in which case it also is recursively 
enumerable without repetition (by definition). | 
14. SCIENTIFIC METHODS 
A machine that generates only totally computable indexes as potential theories 
generates theories whose "predictions," for any given value of the predicate P
that is the subject of the induction, can be obtained by means of a computation. 
That prediction may not be right but it can be obtained effectively. We call a 
logic or a machine that generates only totally computable indexes as potential 
theories a total machine and the corresponding logic a total logic. Let a set of 
predicates be called acceptable if there exists a recursive enumeration of total 
indexes such that all and only the predicates in the set have indexes in the 
enumeration. 
THEOREM 38. Any acceptable set of predicates i  the scope of a total Newtonian 
logic and/or machine. 
Proof. Given an oracle R e of a predicate P, an induction machine reads 
increasingly longer initial sequences of Rp (call them re,l, rp, 2 ,..., rp ....... 
where n is the length of the sequence). Consider the machine that, as it reads 
r~.~, looks through the (given) recursive enumeration of total indexes of the 
acceptable set S, checking each index for consistency with rp,~ until it finds 
the first consistent index. If it finds such an index, it generates it as a theory 
unless that index has already been generated at an earlier stage. I f  it finds no 
such index, it generates nothing, since it never stops looking for an index. 
It is easy to verify that the resulting machine is total and Newtonian. To 
see that its scope is the set S, one need only observe that the machine must 
eventually find (and stick to) a correct index of any predicate in S and that it 
cannot possibly "find" a correct index of a set not in S. (Note that a set of 
predicates need not be acceptable to be the scope of a total Newtonian machine 
since such a machine can have partial predicates in its scope.) 
We say that a theory T correctly describes an icon I of length n if the first n 
symbols of T are identical to the values represented by the first n symbols of L 
We call a Newtonian machine that, for every possible icon, generates a
theory that correctly describes that icon a full machine and the associated logic 
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a full logic. A full Newtonian machine is called a scientific method. It is not 
obvious that this formalizable idea is a suitable equivalent for the informal 
idea of a scientific method, although we will derive some results that suggest 
that it might be. 
THEOREIv[ 39. The scope of a scientific method is infinite. 
Proof. A scientific method must generate a theory that correctly describes 
every icon of the form #shy, where s,, is a sequence of n symbols from the 
alphabet o~' (={0, 1, 2}) and v is one of the symbols from c~'. By tenacity and 
consistency, every theory it generates adds one predicate to its scope so that, 
by induction on n, such a method cannot have a finite scope, which proves the 
theorem. | 
THEOREM 40. _/t scientific method cannot have a properly partially computable 
predicate in its scope. 
Proof. I f  it did, its scope would have a gap (by the argument indicated 
above when we defined the idea of a gap), which is impossible since it is full. | 
COROLLARY 40.1. The scope of a scientific method is an infinite acceptable 
set and every such set is the scope of a scientific method. 
COROLLARY 40.2. The scope of a scientific method is an infinite acceptable 
set that is everywhere dense and dense in itself. 
Since a scientific method never settles on any predicate that is not in its 
scope (and hence does not limiting compute any theory for such a predicate) 
it is easy to see that: 
THEOREM 41. A scientific method must be Leibnitzian. 
Given any predicate in the scope of a scientific method and, indeed, any 
totally computable predicate, there is an effective disproof procedure that, for 
any predicate T in the scope of the method, disproves the contention that T 
is the correct heory (relative to the given method) for the subject of the induc- 
tion if that contention is incorrect. There is not, however (in general), an effective 
proof procedure for showing that the theory generated by such a method is 
the right one for the predicate in question. 
15. COMPLETENESS, SIMPLICITY, CONFIRMATION 
If  we accept these things we are calling "scientific methods" as suitable 
models for what we usually call by this name, then we have a rather simple, 
but striking, contrast between the methods of the scientist and the mathematician 
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(noted by Popper, 1955). The user of the axiomatic method (presumably the 
mathematician), trying to determine whether or not a purported theorem T 
is true in a given axiomatic system, always has available a single general-purpose 
proof procedure that will effectively determine that the theorem T is true 
(provable) in the system. But he or she does not (necessarily) have a complete 
disproof procedure that will, for any T, determine ffectively in a finite number 
of steps, that T is false (i.e., not provable). 
On the other hand, the user of a scientific method (in our sense), trying to 
determine whether a theory T of a given predicate P is correct, has a general 
effective disproof procedure for showing that T is not a correct theory of P, 
but not a general effective procedure for showing that T is correct. The procedure 
that compares all values of T with all values of P is not effective because it 
requires that an infinity of values must be compared if T -  P. But finitely 
many comparisons are all that is needed to show that T ~ P. 
The part of this observation that deals with the mathematician's axiomatic 
method depends on two things. One of these is a thesis proposed by Kleene 
(1943) that identifies axiomatic systems with recursively enumerable sets and 
the second is a famous incompleteness theorem of Goedel (1931) [as strengthened 
by Rosser (1936) and a variety of other "incompleteness theorems"] that show 
that recursively enumerable sets of certain types are not necessarily recursive. 
It is tempting to add a thesis to Kleene's thesis about deduction that we might 
call Popper's thesis. This thesis identifies cientific methods with methods that 
allow effective disproof procedures. And it is then tempting to look for incom- 
pleteness theorems for these "scientific methods." Given an enumeration of 
an acceptable set (i.e., the scope of a scientific method) we can "diagonalize" 
it by defining a predicate D 1 whose value for the argument n differs from the 
value of Pn(n), where P~ is the nth predicate in an enumeration of that set. 
This defines a predicate that is not in the original enumeration and can be 
added (say, as the first) to the original enumeration. The same process can then 
be repeated and applied to the resulting set to define a second diagonal predicate 
D2, and so forth. Now, this set of diagonal predicates D ={D1,  D 2,..., 
D~, Di+l ,...} contains no predicate in the scope of the original scientific method. 
But every index we have defined for such predicates is a total index and we 
have provided an enumerating procedure that clearly is effective. So D is 
acceptable and, by Theorem 40, there exists a scientific method with D as its 
scope which proves: 
THEOREM 42. For every scientific method, there is another scientific method, 
whose scope is completely disjoint from the scope of the given method. 
It follows from this that: 
COROLLARY 42.1. Every scientific method is incomplete with respect to the 
set of totally computable predicates. 
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Since scientific methods are Leibnitzian and since the procedure of Theo- 
rem 42 can be reiterated on the union of the new acceptable set and the original 
union (which is also an acceptable set, as is easily proved) we have aiso proved: 
COROLLARY 42.2. There is an infinity of scientific methods, each of which 
generates an infinity of correct theories, and no incorrect ones, but each of which 
has a scope completely disjoint from any other method in the set, and hence each 
work.; in a "world" totally different from all the others. 
Something like this was conjectured by Chomsky in informal remarks in 1973. 
It implies the possibility that terrestrial science may be totally disjoint (in its 
results) from the science of some other planet and conversely. Each of the 
scientific methods generated by this corollary generates only sound results, but 
no two generate the same theories. If, as seems plausible, scientists cannot 
possibly understand any theory that their own method could not, in principle, 
generate, then this also suggests that the science of one world could be totally 
incomprehensible to the scientists of another. (One does not need two distinct 
planets for this result to apply.) 
Theorem 38 has some other, more positive, consequences that follow from 
the fact that such sets as the set of all regular predicates (the predicates that 
can be evaluated by finite automata), the set of all primitive recursive predicates, 
and others, are all acceptable (Gold, 1965): 
COROLLARY 38.1. There is a scientific method that is complete with respect 
to the regular predicates. 
COROLLARY 38.2. There is a scientific method that is complete with respect 
to the primitive recursive predicates. 
It is easily verified that if A and B are acceptable sets, then so are A w B 
and A c3 B (their union and intersection). With Theorem 37, this proves: 
THEOREM 43. The scopes of scientific methods are closed under intersection, 
union, and relative complement. 
One of our reasons for asking questions about the completeness of logics 
is to be able to compare logics, or procedures for making inductive inferences 
with each other. The traditional approach compares, not procedures, but 
individual inferences. Given a set of premises P and two conclusions C and C', 
one asks questions uch as "Is the inference P--+ C better than the inference 
P -+ C' ?" By focusing on Leibnitzian logics, we tend to deemphasize this 
question since inferences made by Leibnitzian logics are all guaranteed to be 
sound in the sense that they are truth preserving. Their conclusions must be 
true in any world in which their (infinite) premises are all true. But there 
remain differences between logics or inductive methods as represented by 
induction machines. 
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One type of difference will be a difference of scope. If we are looking for 
some kind of "best" logic, it makes sense to look for one that does everything 
we want or one that is complete. But, complete with respect o what ? Complete- 
ness is a relative thing. If we are satisfied with completeness with respect o 
the regular predicates or with respect to the primitive recursive predicates, 
then we can be satisfied by LC logics (although we may still have other reasons 
for preferring to use the incomplete TC or PC logics). 
Having attained such completeness does not, of course, end the possibility 
of comparing logics that have it. There are many ways in which logics with 
identical scopes differ and some of these may provide reasons for preferring 
one complete logic to another. Thus, two logics may "converge" at different 
rates on a given set of theories. One may be easier to use than another because it 
requires fewer computing steps or less "memory" space to achieve a correct 
theory. And so forth. These differences imply different values (and costs) in 
the use of different complete procedures o that simply finding a complete 
logic does not end the problem of finding a "best" procedure. But it ends it 
within the limits I have set for this paper. I will not be concerned with matters 
of efficiency, important as these can be. 
Induction machines and inductive logics can be used for purposes other than 
doing induction, however. One thing they can be used for is to provide models 
for, or theories of, induction as it is practiced by various kinds of biological 
and/or electronic systems. In this role we do not ask "How broad is the scope 
of such and such a machine ?" or "How efficient is it ?" but rather "How 
accurate is it as a model for so and so ?" The kinds of abstract objects that we 
have been calling "scientific methods" can serve as abstract models for, or 
theories of, the process of doing science and we now briefly consider them in 
this role. 
Note that a scientific method can be defined by what we might call its 
"hypothesizing function" h. Let such a hypothesizing function be a function of 
icons whose values h(I~) are integers denoting predicates in some acceptable 
enumeration of predicate indexes. 
Assume that we have been given some acceptable set S. Let a hypothesizing 
function h over S be a function that, for every possible icon (including the 
null icon) generates a total index of some predicate in S. Such a function defines 
a scientific method if we associate with it the scientific method that generates, 
for every icon I,~, the index h(I~) unless an earlier generated index is consistent 
with I~. Given an enumeration of all the icons (and the usual one that enu- 
merates them in order of length and within length lexicographically will do) 
such a function induces an enumeration on S if we put P ~ S in the earliest 
position in which an index of it appears in the enumeration of the range of h 
applied to the enumerated icons. 
It seems reasonable to say that (for a given scientific method) a predicate P
is simpler than another Q if it is generated earlier by that method's hypothesizing 
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function as it heads down the standard enumeration of its scope. Given an 
arbitrary index of a predicate P, one cannot always determine ffectively where 
P lies in such a simplicity ordering. (Proof is left to the reader.) But one can do 
so if one is given the index used in the acceptable numeration of S. (Recall 
that any computable predicate has infinitely many indexes and that there is 
no general effective way of telling two indexes denote the same predicate.) 
Such a simplicity ordering then can give an account of our intuitive notions 
of simplicity or of observed simplicity judgments. One judges such accounts, 
not by how powerful they are, but by how accurately they characterize the 
available data about simplicity. The theoretical and empirical investigation of 
such orderings might produce interesting results. 
Simplicity measures are one way of evaluating a proposed theory of P in 
terms of the given evidence In.  I f  two theories T and T'  are both consistent 
with I.~, we say that T is better than T', relative to the scientific method M, 
if T is earlier in the simplicity order generated by M than T'. Such measures 
are closely related to confirmation functions that can be thought of intuitively 
as assigning the highest degree of confirmation to the predicate that, relative 
to the given evidence, accounts for that evidence and is also the simplest. Much 
of the present-day theory of induction is based on the idea of a confirmation 
measure, as in the work of Carnap (1962). There is close correlation between 
scientific methods and confirmation measures which we now briefly consider. 
A confirmation measure is a function c that associates with each icon-predicate 
pair <1~, P )  a real number c(I~, P) (0 <~ c(In, P)<~ 1) with the following 
properties: 
(1) For a given set of evidence, represented by its icon, l~,  the values of 
c(I~, P) summed over the set of all possible predicates is equal to 1. (We might 
write fP (In, P)  = 1.) 
(2) A single inconsistency between the oracle of P and the icon In dis- 
confirms P or/,~ ~ 0~,~ --+ c(I~, P) ~ O. 
(3) Increasingly longer initial segments of the oracle of a predicate P 
(as icons) make the value of the confirmation function approach the value of 1 
(certainty) in the limit, or l im~ c(O~.~, P) = 1. 
Feature (2) above may seem quite strange in an account of confirmation. It 
seems to say that if we are doing induction over a predicate P and a single 
observed value of P disagrees with a single predicted value of our theory T, 
then P is to be counted as disconfirmed. This would certainly be strange if the 
theory T with which we were dealing were the theory as expressed in simple 
terms such as, for example, "Cyclamates cause cancer in rats." We clearly do 
not consider such a theory to be disproved if a single rat, having ingested 
cyclamates, fails to contract cancer. 
But suppose that we state our theory as saying something like "The hypothesis 
that cyclamates cause cancer in rats is accepted at a .05 level." If, furthermore, 
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we are dealing with scientific methods whose hypothesizing functions generate 
the null hypothesis before the kinds of nonnull hypothesis exemplified by our 
theory, we can (after filling in more details which I omit) probably give a 
reasonable account of confirmation theory in terms of computable (but proba- 
bilistically stated) theories. Such accounts are based on disconfirmation rather 
than confirmation, but this is surely within the spirit of much of the modern 
theory of confirmation. 
One way to relate confirmation theory, which is so heavily probabilistic, with 
our theory of induction is to relate confirmation functions with induction 
machines as follows. We say that a confirmation measure c captures a machine 
if: 
(1) It captures its scope or if c(I~, P) = 0 for some n (and c(I~, P) = 0 
for all m > n) for all predicates P not in the scope of the machine. 
(2) It captures its hypothesizing function in the sense that, whenever the 
machine generates an index of P as its theory of an icon I .  then 
c(I~, P) > c(I,~, Q) for all predicates Q va P. 
This second requirement allows us to replace the hypothesizing function 
of the original logic with a minimizing function on the associated confirmation 
measure. By a straightforward construction we can prove the following theorem 
(whose proof we omit): 
THEOm~M 44. For any scientific method, there is a confirmation measure that 
captures it. 
COROLLARY 44.1. That confirmation measure is not unique. 
This corollary indicates that a confirmation measure gives us information 
not given by the machine it captures. On the other hand, the machine computes 
an index of the predicate in question which we cannot necessarily compute 
from the confirmation measure. 
16. HYPER-LIMITING COMPUTABLE INDUCTION 
Limiting computable logics that are Leibnitzian solve a problem about 
induction that we have called "Hume's problem": "How can we know that 
the results of our inductions are correct ?" The answer it gives is that of Leibnitz 
(1956): "The conclusions of our inductive inference have to be true if the 
premises from which they are derived are also true (and the inference has been 
properly made)." This answer can provide a basis for a strictly logical theory 
of induction because it gives us a criterion according to which we can sort out 
sound inductive inferences from unsound ones that does not depend on any 
features of the particular world in which we happen to find ourselves. 
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There is, however, another problem about induction that Leibnitzian logics 
do not solve. This is the problem that we have called "Peirce's problem." 
It was suggested by Peirce (1960) and it can be expressed by the question 
"Granted that induction does not yield any wrong conclusions, how can we 
know that those conclusions that it does yield are applicable to this particular 
world ?" We might reply that this is no problem if we know that this world 
contains (in some sense of "contains") only regular or primitive recursive 
predicates. But then one might ask how we know this. Presumably we cannot 
know this on strictly logical grounds. 
I f  we could find a logic that was complete with respect o all the computable 
predicates, we could answer Peirce's question in the manner in which Kant 
might have answered it. We know that a logic that is complete with respect o 
the set of all computable predicates cannot get all the possibly correct theories 
that might apply in this world. But since it "gets" all the computable predicates 
and since computable predicates are the only ones that we can actually use, it 
gets us- -not  everything there i s~but  everything we can use. There might be 
uncomputable theories of the world which such a logic, complete only with 
respect o the set of computable theories, might not get, but this would hardly 
matter. I f  we used a logic that got us an uncomputable theory, we would not 
be able to use that theory since we could not, in general, determine what it said 
about particular values of the predicate that it was a theory of. In short, such 
a logic, whose scope included predicates that are not computable, would give 
us results that, owing to the limits of our intellectual machinery, we could not 
use .  
In this section, we consider logics that are complete with respect o the set 
of all computable predicates and that can, therefore, be used in such a solution 
to Peirce's problem. We call such logics "hyper-limiting computable logics" 
or "HC logics." They are based on the notions of hyper-limiting computations 
and hyper-limiting computable functions defined as follows: 
A machine, 21//, is said to hyper-limiting compute the value x for the argument y 
if, given y as an input, it prints the value x infinitely often. If  M prints more 
than one value infinitely often for the input y, we look at all the values that M 
prints out infinitely often and say that it hyper-limiting computes that value 
among all these whose first appearance was earliest in this (obviously infinite) 
output. 
A machine, M, hyper-limiting computes a functional, F, if for every function, 
y, it hyper-limiting computes the value F(y) unless F(y) is undefined, in which 
case the machine M may either hyper-limiting compute the value undefined 
or it may fall to hyper-limiting compute any value at all. (Note that, as before, 
F(y) can be computed undefined if the machine that represents F prints infinitely 
many occurrences of ## in response to the input y, and uncomputed undefined 
if F fails to print any value infinitely often.) Finally, we say that a logic is a 
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hyper-limiting computable or HC logic if there is a hyper-limiting computable 
functional that represents it. 
The main theorem about such (HC) logics is the following: 
THEOREM 45 (Feldman, 1972, Kugel, 1973). HC logics can be complete with 
respect to the set of all computable predicates, and hence with respect to any 
subset of this set, including the set of all totally computable predicates. 
Proof. Consider the procedure that runs in stages, beginning at the first 
stage and preceding through the nth stage after completing the (n -  1)th, 
where the nth stage goes as follows: 
Stage n. Run the first n machines in the enumeration of all (three-tape 
Turing) machines, that have not been "disqualified" at some previous stage, 
on the inputs representing the integers from 1 through n (where n is the number 
of symbols in the given icon) and run each of these machine-input pairs for 
n steps. 
If the operation of the machine M i on the input j computes a value after 
n steps (or earlier) check this value against he jth symbol of the icon I. If this 
value, v, is the same as the value represented by the jth symbol of the input 
oracle, 1, then check the results computed by running Mi on each of the integers 
smaller than j for n steps. For each symbol of the icon that is not the symbol 2 
(representing the value undefined), check to see if the value M i computes for 
the input j '  (j' ~ j) is the symbol represented by the j 'th symbol of the icon I. 
If it is, for allj' < j  for which M i has computed a value after n steps, then the 
jth value of M i is said to have been verified and the index i is printed out on 
the output tape once for each j '  for which the index M i has not previously 
been printed out. If, on the other hand, Mi computes a value (after n steps) 
for an input j '  that is different from the value represented by the j 'th symbol 
of the icon I, the machine M i is "disqualified" and dropped from further 
consideration. 
If, at some step n, some machine verifies the last symbol of the icon (read 
up to that point), the procedure advances the input tape head one square to 
the right. (For the purposes of this proof, one does not need tO be fussy about 
when the input tape head is moved and the next symbol of the icon is examined. 
Any procedure that eventually looks at each possible symbol of the input oracle 
will do.) 
Now, it is easy to see that this procedure finishes the nth step for each possible 
n after a finite number of steps and that it eventually reaches each square of 
the input oracle. I claim that the index it hyper-limiting computes (if there is 
one) is a correct index for the given oracle, and that it hyper-limiting computes 
an index for every possible computable predicate. To verify this claim, consider 
the possible machines, M i , that this procedure might encounter: 
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(1) Suppose that there is some x such that M i computes a value y for 
the argument x such that this value y = Mi(x) is distinct from the value P(x) 
of the predicate, P, that is the subject of the induction. Then clearly this machine 
gets disqualified after a finite period of time and its index cannot therefore be 
printed infinitely often on the output tape. 
(2) Suppose that Mi computes infinitely many values of P (the subject 
of the induction) correctly. Then there are three possible cases: 
(i) M computes infinitely many values correctly but also computes 
some values incorrectly. Then, for the first incorrect (computed) value, M i is 
"disqualified" and its index, therefore, is not printed out infinitely often. 
(ii) Mi computes infinitely many values correctly but also fails to 
compute some of the values that are defined. Then as soon as a position corre- 
sponding to an argument for which P(x) is defined, but Mi(x) is uncomputed 
undefined, is reached, the index of M i is never printed out again--which means 
that it is only printed out finitely often since x is finite. 
(iii) Mi computes every (defined) value correctly and none of the 
(defined or undefined) values incorrectly. Then at the end of every computation 
of a correct value, the index of Mi is either printed out or it is eventually printed 
out when the intervening defined values have been correctly computed. In any 
case, the index of Mi is printed out infinitely often (which is what is wanted, 
since M i computes P). 
(3) Finally, suppose that P has only finitely many computed values. Then 
there may be some machine Mi that partially computes P that is only validated 
finitely often and the index of this machine, which is correct, is only printed 
out finitely often. But there must also be a machine, M i ,  that totally computes 
P because, as is easily proved, there is some machine that totally computes 
any predicate with only finitely many values that are defined. And this machine 
will, through the courtesy of its infinitely many computed undefined values, 
have its index printed out infinitely often. 
Conditions (1) and (2)(i) apply to any machine that generates a wrong value 
and condition (2)(ii) takes care of machines that incorrectly represent theories 
because they do not do enough. It disqualifies any machine that fails to com- 
pute P correctly. Conditions (2)(iii) and (3) assure us that, for every predicate 
that is computable, some correct index will get printed out infinitely often 
(and, for that matter, that infinitely many correct indexes will get printed out 
infinitely often), which proves the theorem. | 
A hyper-limiting computation can evaluate functions, functionals, and, with 
some variation, predicates. It turns out that the mappings it can evaluate are 
those mappings that are just one step higher in the Arithmetic Hierarchy than 
the limiting computable mappings. We prove this for the predicates, but before 
we do this, we need to define what it means for a machine Mi to hyper-limiting 
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compute a predicate P. Note that it will not do to say that a machine hyper- 
limiting computes the value y for the argument x if it prints out the value y 
infinitely often before it prints out any of the other (two) possible truth values. 
We could show (but will not) that such a machine could not carry out the 
procedure of the preceding theorem and that, as a matter of fact, such a machine 
evaluates precisely the predicates in 271 of the Arithmetic Hierarchy. Instead 
we define the hyper-limiting computation of a value in terms of a two-dimen- 
sional output tape divided into squares, with one square for each of the coordi- 
nates (zl ,  zz), where zl and z 2 are any positive integers. We say that the machine 
Mi hyper-limiting computes the value "true" for the argument x if it prints 
infinitely many l's (representing true) but only finitely many O's in the column 
(set of squares) corresponding to a single value, z, on the output tape where 
the column corresponding to z is the set of all squares with the coordinates 
(z, z~) for any z 2 . We say that Mi hyper-limiting computes the value "false" if 
it prints an infinity of O's in the column corresponding to some z and hyper- 
limiting computes the value "undefined" if it either prints an infinity of 2's in 
such a column or it prints no value infinitely often in any column, it is this 
process of printing out an infinity of values in a given column (rather than 
simply printing out an infinity of occurrences of a single value) that defines the 
output of a hyper-limiting computation of a predicate. 
DEFINITION. We say that a machine, Mi,  hyper-limiting computes the 
predicate, P, whose value is true, for the argument x, if Mi hyper-limiting com- 
putes the value 1 for the input x and either hyper-limiting computes the value 0, 
2, or no value at all for those arguments for which P is not true. 
We can now turn to: 
THEOREM 46. The predicates that can be hyper-limiting computed are precisely 
the predicates in Z~ of the Arithmetic Hierarchy. 
Proof. Suppose that P is in 27~. Then there is a definition of P of the form 
P(x) ~eer (Bx~)(Vx2)(3xa)(R4(x' xl ' x2' xa)) 
with a totally computable (four-place) predicate R4. Thus there is a machine M 
that computes the values of R ~ for any quadruple of integers as input. Consider 
the procedure based on this M that computes R4(x, x 1 , x~, Xa). Let this proce- 
dure be given only one input, x, and let it begin by computing R4(x, 1, 1,' 1), 
R~(x, 1, 1, 2),..., Ra(x, 1, 1, xa), R~(x, 1, 1, x a q- 1),..., etc., for successive values 
of x a until it hits some Xa for which the predicate in question is computed as 
"true." At this point, let the procedure continue with the same process, but 
this time replacing the value of x2 with x~ q- 1 (which is to say, at this initial 
stage, computing R4(x, 1, 2, 1), Ra(x, 1, 2, 2), R~(x, 1, 2, 3),..., etc. Each time 
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this process comes up with a "true," let the column corresponding to the 
current value of x 1 (= 1 so far) have a 1 (for "true") printed in it. 
It is easy to see that if the current value of x 1 has the symbol 1 printed in 
its corresponding column on the output tape infinitely often, it could only be 
because, for all values x2, there really was an x a such that R4(xl,  x2, x3) or 
Ra(x, 1, x 2 , x3) when x = 1. That is to say, it would have to be the case that 
(2xl)(Vx2)(3xs) R4(x, x l ,  x2, x3), and 1 would be that x 1 . 
However, this procedure will not do the job if it turns out that 1 is the 
wrong x 1 . Some procedure of this same sort (with a different xl) would do the 
job correctly for that x I if there was a suitable x~, but our master procedure 
would never "get to" it. This problem is simple to get around. We simply 
dovetail the computations that successively run through the values x 2 and of x 3 
for given x and x 1 , perhaps running each of the first n through the first n steps 
as in the proof of Theorem 45. It is easy to verify that such a dovetailed proce- 
dure will print out infinite column l's in the column(s) corresponding to the 
values of x 1 for which it is true that, for all integers xz, there is an x 3 such that 
R4(x, x 1 , x~., xa), which is to say that P is true for that x. It is also easy to see 
that it does not print such a column for x if there is no such x~, which proves 
this half of the theorem. 
To prove the other half of the theorem consider the case of a machine, M, 
that hyper-limiting computes the predicate P. There is a totally computable 
predicate that answers the question: 
"Given the input x, does the machine, M, print a 1 in the column corre- 
sponding to y at the moment z or not ?" 
Call this predicate R(x, y, z). Now, clearly the machine, M, hyper-limiting 
computes the value "true" if and only if there exists a y such that for all z 
there is another z'(z' > z) such that R(x ,y ,  z') or, in symbols: 
p(x) _= (~y)(Vz)(~z')[R(x, y z) ~ (z' > ~) a R(~, y, ~')]. 
Since R is totally computable, so is the expression in brackets in the right- 
hand side of the above. This completes the proof since this expression is a 
definition in the form required for membership in 273 . 
We have shown that there are complete logics computable in 273 of the 
Arithmetic Hierarchy. Such logics carry with them all the desirable attributes 
of the LC logics, with one exception. One does not know, at a given time t, 
whether the theory that led to the forward advance of the input tape head 
really is the theory that the logic has put forth as its theory of evidence. In 
other words such logics appear to fail not only to know that they know (as 
the LC logics do) but also, in some sense, to know what they know. 
The beginning of a theory of abstract machines beyond the trial-and-error 
machines is developed by Schubert (1974) and some relatively concrete inter- 
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pretations of such machines are discussed by Criscuolo et al. (1975). One thing 
these papers suggest is that there are, in a sense, abstract machines capable of 
evaluating each of the Z classes of the Arithmetic Hierarchy. 
One way to develop such a hierarchy of machines i  to expand the construction 
we used in the proof of Feldman's theorem (Theorem 45) into more than two 
dimensions. Each additional dimension "in time" then allows the resulting 
"machine" to evaluate predicates one step higher in the 27 part of the Arithmetic 
Hierarchy. 
The fact that such a hierarchy of abstract machines exists (in the mathematical 
sense of "exist") does not mean that we can think of useful interpretations 
for all the classes in this hierarchy. The HC machines can be thought of as 
representing "expanding communities of procedures" (Criscuolo, et al., 1975) 
which, in turn, might be thought of as representing either a single mind con- 
sisting of a community of trial-and-error machines working in parallel or a 
communky of minds, each represented by a single such machine. 
17. PRESENTATION OF ]~VIDENCE 
In our discussion of induction so far, we have assumed that the manner in 
which the evidence (or values of the predicate that is the subject of an induction) 
is presented was always complete (every value is presented eventually) and serial 
(the values were presented in their natural order P(1), P(2), P(3),...). But 
clearly, these assumptions do not always apply to induction. 
For example, we often encounter variation in the order in which evidence is 
presented. Intuitively, one can imagine a variety of ways in which evidence 
might be presented other than serially. The ordering might, for example, be 
under control of the system making the induction, as in the case of the scientist 
who can choose what observations to make next (within the limits of the 
available equipment). Or it might be under the control of the environment, 
as in the case of the newborn child in its crib whose "world" and ordering seems.. 
forced upon it. The ordering of the evidence might be one that facilitates 
learning or an ordering that interferes with it. Each of the possibilities defines 
different ypes of inductive procedures with different kinds of scopes and limits, 
but all can be trated in our framework. (See Kugel, 1973.) 
One "helpful" way to organize evidence presentation is to use the presenta- 
tion order to "cheat" and pass the index of the function to the machine doing 
the induction. Thus, consider the set of totally computable predicates that are 
true for infinite sets of integers, and at least one value for which they are false. 
The  values of such predicates can be presented so that the first i arguments 
(where i is an index of the predicate that is the subject of the induction) are 
presented followed by one argument for which the value is "false." Given 
such an evidence function, there is a PC logic whose scope is the set of all 
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totally computable functions except hose that are true for "too few" arguments. 
(By appropriate coding we can even get these predicates into the scope with 
one or two exceptions.) This shows how the order in which evidence is presented 
can affect he scope of the logic. (For more on this matter, see Blum and Blum, 
1975.) 
A particularly interesting "helpful" evidence function has been studied by 
Gold (1967), who refers to it as "presentation by primitive recursion." If  we 
think of the "evidence" as being presented by ordered pairs, (a, v), where a is 
the argument and v is the value, and we allow the repetition of such pairs, then 
we can imagine a machine that presents the totally computable predicates by 
computing them and repeating the latest argument-value pair every time that 
the computation goes through another step without producing the next value. 
An induction machine that is given this additional "timing" information can 
use it when a "next value" is presented (as it must be if the predicate is total 
and the evidence function complete) to rule out of consideration any index in 
its enumeration which is taking "too long" to compute the values required for 
validation. In this way, one can, as Gold has proved, define LC machines whose 
scope is the set of all totally computable total predicates. 
Such an ordering of the evidence can represent the role that pauses and 
other intonation features may play in making language learning possible. The 
rates at which words are uttered and the pauses between them may relate to 
the amount of time that it takes a person to "compute" the parts of the sentences 
and this, in turn, may provide a language learner with precisely the information 
required to learn an arbitrary (totally computable) grammar by a limiting 
procedure. 
Another way in which evidence presentation can vary is in its degree of 
completeness. Thus, one can imagine a presentation that, knowing the subject 
of the induction, gives only positive instances of the predicate. (That is, it gives 
values only for those arguments for which the predicate is true.) Such a situation 
seems to be encountered by the child when it learns the grammar of its native 
language (which we could represent by a predicate that is true for the indexes 
of grammatical utterances and false for the indexes of nongrammatieal utterances) 
from hearing only correct, grammatical, utterances. Different evidence-selecting 
procedures have different implications, some of which have been studied by 
Gold (1967) and Kugel (1973). 
As long as the evidence presentation is required to be complete and as long 
as we ignore the rate at which the induction machine converges to the proper 
theory, a machine can always "wait" for the values it needs. Completeness 
assures it that the correct value will eventually come and as long as we do not 
care how long the logic or machine takes for convergence, the rearrangement 
of the order in which the evidence is presented oes not change the scope. 
Once we allow an evidence presentation to omit values, the story changes. The 
worst case (and probably the most trivial) is the evidence function that omits 
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all possible values. An induction machine, faced with such a function, can have 
only one predicate in its scope. 
There are less trivial, and more interesting, partial or incomplete vidence 
functions. A positive evidence function is a function that presents only those 
arguments (and values) of the predicate P for which P is true. Let us call a 
predicate finitely true if it is true for only finitely many (or no) values. Gold (1967) 
has proved: 
THEOREM 47. There is an LC logic, with a positive evidence function, whose 
scope is the set of all finitely true total predicates, but there is no such logic whose 
scope is this set together with even one total predicate that is not finitely true. 
Feldman (1972) has shown some ways in which these difficulties can be 
circumvented. One natural way of circumventing the limitations of this theorem 
is either to generate only finitely true predicates as theories or to generate as 
theories only predicates that are not finitely true. These are two different 
strategies, one corresponding to rote memorization and the other trying to 
develop "infinite" theories that always go beyond the information given. 
Let us say that one predicate, P, positively dominates another, P' ,  if P is true 
for every argument for which P '  is true but P :/: P ' .  We call a set of predicates 
with infinite domains positively separable if no predicate in the set dominates 
another. It is easy to show that (Kugel, 1973): 
THEOREM 48. For any positively separable set of totally computable predicates, 
S, there is an LC logic with positive evidence function that has S in its scope. 
THEOREM 49. There exists an LC logic, with positive evidence function, whose 
scope contains predicates that positively dominate ach other, but there is no such 
logic whose scope contains a predicate that positively dominates an infinity of other 
predicates in that scope. 
COROLLARY 49.1. No LC logic with positive evidence function both can have 
an infinite scope and can contain the predicate that is everywhere true. 
COROLLARY 49.2. The scope of the LC logics with positive evidence functions 
is not closed under set union. 
In the case of the positive evidence functions, the partiality of the presentation 
is under the control of the "world" or "nature." Another interesting case arises 
when the partiality is under the control of the system doing the induction. 
Let us call a total predicate with infinite domain a concept. Given a predicate, P, 
we say that the concept C computably tiles P if there is an everywhere com- 
putable concept C such that C(x) = P(x) for all values of x for which C(x) is 
true and C(x) is undefined everywhere lse. A concept C can be thought of as 
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giving a partial account of the predicate P that it computably tiles. We say 
that a sequence of predicates P1, P2 ,... quilts a predicate P if each P~ tiles 
the predicate Q~-I that is undefined for every argument for which any of the 
predicates P , ,  P2 .... , Pi-1 is undefined and for any x for which P is true, 
there is a y such that P,y(x) is true. The following lemma is due to Post (1944): 
LEMMA. Every infinite partially computable set has an infinite totally com- 
putable subset. 
Using this lemma, we can prove: 
THEOREM 50. Every partially computable predicate can be quilted. 
Intuitively, this theorem, suggests that, for partially computable predicates, 
we can say increasingly more about these predicates even if our theories are 
always required to be totally computable. 
18. LoGIcs REALIZABLE BY FINITE AUTOMATA 
So far we have been dealing with induction machines and logics that use at 
least the machinery of the Turing machine. One can imagine induction limited 
to less powerful machinery and one might hypothesize that such a limitation 
might decrease the power of the method of induction. But this is not as clearly 
the case as it might at first appear. Let us call a logic a regular computable ogic 
if there is an induction machine with only a finite work tape that represents it. 
Such machines have only the machinery of finite automata to do both the jobs 
of hypothesis generation and rejection (although nothing in the definition 
prevents them from generating the indexes of functions that cannot be evaluated 
by finite automate). 
The following results shows how limited our TC logics really are: 
THEOREM 5l. _/I set of computable predicates, S, is the scope of a regular 
computable ogic if and only if it is the scope of a TC logic. 
Proof. We need only prove that the scope of an RC (regular computable) 
logic is a finite set of predicates and that every finite set of computable predicates 
is the scope of an RC logic. To see the latter consider the finite tape machine 
that has an internal representation f enough of the initial segment of the oracle 
of every predicate in the scope S so that no two initial segments agree with each 
other (have the same symbols in the same locations). Now let this algorithm 
"wait" until it has "seen" enough of the oracle of the given predicate to distin- 
guish it from all other possibilities in the scope and then prints out the index 
if there is one, and the output "undefined" if there is none. It is easy to verify 
that this algorithm has the required scope and is an RC procedure. 
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One the other hand, to see that an RC procedure must have a finke scope 
consider the fact that there can be only finitely many possible complete descrip- 
tions of the state of such a device (excluding the full state of the input tape) 
and that there can be at most one output for each such description. | 
Thus, there is a sense in which, in our theory, finite automata nd infinite 
tape Turing machines that "only" compute totally computable functions are 
equivalent. 
One the other hand, it turns out that the machinery of the RC logics can go 
beyond the TC logics if one defines the output in the manner of the limiting 
computable ogics. Thus let us say that a finite automaton M is a regular limiting 
computable machine (RL machine) if it has the machinery of the RC logics but, 
instead of counting, as its output, the first index that it computes for a predicate 
(as input) we count the last (as in the case of a limiting computing machine). 
The following theorem shows that such machines, although limited to finite 
scopes (proof left to the reader) can do things that even PC machines cannot: 
THEOREM 52. RL machines can be Leibnitzian. 
The proof is straightforward. One thing that this theorem says intuitively, 
when taken together with the fact that PC logics cannot be Leibnitzian, is that 
one can do things with potentially infinite (noncomputably long) time that one 
cannot do with potentially infinite space. 
19. INDUCTION OF UNCOMPUTABLE PREDICATES 
Even if human induction is appropriately imited to procedures that try to 
identify only computable predicates or functions, there are reasons why one 
might want to ask questions about induction over uncomputable predicates. 
One reason is that some of the results we have described seem to have natural 
generalizations because the proofs do not seem to depend, in significant ways, 
on the value of n in the X~ class over which one is doing induction. Thus, for 
example, it seems natural to conjecture that Theorem 32 can be generalized 
to show- that procedures in Z~+ 1 can be Leibnitzian in doing induction over 
Z~ (n > 1) and that the Theorem 45 can be generalized to show that procedures 
in Z~+2 Can be complete for the set of predicates in Z~ (n > 1). 
Another reason for wanting to study induction over more powerful predicates 
is suggested by the thought hat if human induction is suitably represented by 
procedures in Z 2 or Z~, then doing induction over such procedures uitably 
represents the process of studying human induction. For example, if human 
induction is suitably represented by the LC machines and psychologists hope 
to study this process inductively, then the question "What can we learn about 
human induction?" reduces to the question ',What can LC machines learn 
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about LC machines ?" It seems reasonable to conjecture that the answer to this 
question is "not much." 
But the limits of psychology would be seriously circumscribed with respect 
to the study of induction if we required psychology be a science in the traditional 
sense. For example, if we make the plausible assumption that what we call 
"intelligence" is the ability to do induction well, and that what we mean by 
"test" is some sort of an effective procedure, then the question "What can 
intelligence tests measure ?" reduces to "What differences between LC proce- 
dures can a TC procedure distinguish ?" Again the answer is probably "not 
much." Studies of such questions might set quite stringent limits on what 
psychology can determine about induction, using only the methods of the 
traditional sciences. 
There are other questions that the theory here suggests. One is the question 
"Is human induction properly represented by LC machines or HC machines ?" 
It is hard to imagine any scientific experiment that could resolve this question, 
particularly since we usually treat computers as Turing machines when any 
reasonable mpirical observations show them to have finite memory and thus 
to "be" finite automata. But the answer to this question about he proper models 
for human induction implies an answer to the question "Are there innate 
ideas ?" in the light of Gold's Incompleteness Theorem (Theorem 36) for X 2 
and Feldman's Completeness Theorem (Theorem 45) for Za. 
The fact that human and animal induction almost certainly evolved suggests 
other questions about induction over noncomputable predicates. If, for example, 
we identify what Wilson (1975) has called the "direction of learning" with the 
hypothesizing functions of LC machines, then we might think of the evolution 
of this "directiort" as a limiting, or hyperlimiting, computable search for a 
"survivable" procedure through the set of LC procedures. Answers to questions 
about the completeness and/or reliability of such search procedures could take 
us up to Z' 5 and might bear on the limits of the biological evolution of intelligence. 
There are many questions one might ask about induction over machines that 
are less than computing machines, merely such machines, or more than com- 
puting machines. We have touched on only a few. There are many more. 
20. CoNcLusION 
In this paper, I have presented one kind of theory about induction. There 
are many things that a theory of induction might try to do. It might try to be 
prescriptive and tell us how we should go about making inductive inferences. 
It might be descriptive and try to tell us how we do, in fact go about making 
inferences. It might be practical and tell us how to go about making inductive 
inferences efficiently. The theory I have outlined here tries to do none of these 
things. Instead it tries to formulate a question that, in some sense, has to be 
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dealt with before one can develop prescriptive, descriptive, or practical theories 
of inductive inference. 
The question I have tried to formulate is "What is the nature of inductive 
inference ?" I have suggested some possible answers and have tried to assess 
their merits from a rather theoretical point of view. The kinds of assessments 
I have developed here do not tell us what methods to use for which purposes 
or even what methods people do, as a matter of fact, use. What they do tell us 
is some of the consequences of choosing one kind of answer ather than another. 
The theory I have developed here is a kind of "meta-theory" which deals, 
not with inductive inferences directly, but rather with procedures for making 
such inferences. The main question it tries to deal with is not the question 
"What is sound inductive inference?" but rather the question "What is a 
sound way to make, or recognize, correct inductive inferences ?" Rather than 
try to answer this question, I have tried, in this paper, to formulate some ways 
in which this question might be asked. I have primarily tried to suggest some 
places where we might look for viable accounts of induction. 
Recall the old story of the drunk looking for his keys under the street light. 
"Did you drop them here?" asks the policeman. "No," the drunk replies, 
" I  dropped them down the block." "Then why are you looking for them here ?" 
the policeman inquires. "Because the light is better here," says the drunk. 
I have tried to suggest hat those who look for computer programs to do 
sound induction, and those who look for axiomatic systems to characterize it
precisely, may be making the drunkard's mistake. They may be looking for 
precise accounts of induction where there are none. The "light" may be better 
in Z 0 and Z 1 but adequate accounts of induction are almost certainly not going 
to be found there. This does not, however, mean that they cannot be found. 
They may be just "down the block" in Z~ and Z~. 
RECEIVED: March 21, 1975; REVISED: March 4, 1977 
REFERENCES 
ARISTOTLE (1949), Prior analytics, in "Prior and Posterior Analytics," Oxford Univ. Press, 
New York. 
BACON, F. (1949), "Novum Organum," Regnery, Chicago. 
BARZDIN, JA. M., AND FREIVALD, R. V. (1972), On the prediction of general recursive 
functions, Soviet Math. Dohl. 13, 1224-1228. 
BIERMANN, A. W. (1972), On the inference of turing machines from sample computations, 
Artificial Intelligence 3, 181-198. 
BLUM, L., AND BLUM, M. (1975), Toward a mathematical theory of inductive inference, 
Inform. Contr. 28, 125-155. 
CARt,rAP, R. (1962), "Logical Foundations of Probability," 2nd ed., Chicago Univ. Press, 
Chicago. 
CHOMSK¥, N. (1957), "Syntactic Structures," Mouton, The Hague. 
CHOMSKY, N. (1965), "Aspects of the Theory of Syntax," M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
INDUCTION, PURE AND SIMPLE 335 
CHOMSKY, N. (1968), "Language and Mind," Harcourt, Brace & World, New York. 
CHUI~CH, A. (1936), An unsolvable problem in elementary number theory, Amer. J. 
Math. 58, 345-363. 
CRISCUOLO, G. MINICOZZI, E., AND TRATTEUR, G. (1975), Limiting recursion and the 
arithmetic hierarchy, Rev. Franfaise Informat. Recherche Opdrationnelle (Dec. 1975), 
5-12. 
FELD~AN, J. (1972), Some decidability results on grammatical inference and complexity, 
Inform. Contr. 20, 244-262. 
GOEDEL, K. (1931), Uber formal unentscheidbare satze der Principia Mathematica und 
verwandter System, I, Monath. Math. Phys. 38, 173-198. 
GOLD, E. M. (1965), Limiting recursion, f. Symbolic Logic 30, 28-48. 
GOLD, E. M. (1967), Language identification in the limit, Inform. Contr. 10, 447-474. 
HINTIKtC~, J. (1966), A two-dimensional continuum of inductive methods, in "Aspects 
of Logic" (J. Hintikka and P. Suppes, Eds.), North-Holland, New York. 
HORSING, J. J. (1969), "A Study of Grammatical Inference," Ph. D. Thesis, Stanford 
University. 
HUM~, D. (1911), "A Treatise of Human Nature," Dent, London. 
JEROSLOW, R. G. (1975), Experimental logics and zl2°-theories, jr. Philosophical Logic 4, 
253-266. 
KETENE, S. C. (1943), Recursive predicates and quantifiers, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 53, 
41-73. 
KOENm, D. (1936), "Theorie der endlichen und unendlichen Graphen," Akademische 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Leipzig. 
KUC~L, P. (1973), "Logics of Discovery," Ph .D.  Thesis, Harvard University. 
KUC~L, P. (1975), A theorem about automatic programming, S IGART Newsletter 51, 
5-8. 
KuoEc, P. (1976), What can a computer learn from examples ? S IGART Newsletter 57, 
13-15. 
LEIBNITZ, G. W. (1956), "Philosophical Papers and Letters," Univ. of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
MInIcozzr, E., Some natural properties of inductive inference, Istituto di Fisica Teorica, 
Naples, to appear. 
MOSTOWSKI, A. (1947), On definable sets of positive integers, Fund. Math. 34, 81-211. 
NAy, D. (1975), A note on the correctness of Kugel's paper, S IGART Newsletter 54, 3-4. 
PEIRCE, C. S. (1960), "Collected Papers" (C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, Eds.), Belknap, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
PODNIEKS, K. M. (1975), Probabilistic synthesis of enumerable classes of functions, Dohl. 
Akad. Nauk SSSR 223, 1071-1074. 
POPPER, K. R. (1955), "The Logic of Scientific Discovery," Harper & Row, New York. 
POST, E, (1944), Recursively enumerable sets of positive integers and their decision 
problems, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 50, 284-316. 
PUTNAM, H. (1962), "Degree of confirmation" and inductive logic, in "The Philosophy 
of Rudolf Carnap" (P. A. Schilpp, Ed.), Tudor, New York. 
PUTNAM, H. (1965), Trial and error predicates and the solution of a problem of Mostowski, 
f. Symbolic Logic 20, 49-57. 
REICHENBACH, H. (1938), "Experience and Prediction," Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
ROGERS, H., JR. (1967), "Recursive Functions and Effective Computability," McGraw- 
Hill, New York. 
Ross~R, J. B. (1936), Extensions of some theorems of Goedel and Church, f. Symbolic 
Logic 1, 87-91. 
SCHOENFELD, J. R. (1967), "Mathematical Logic," Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 
336 PETER KUGEL 
SCHUBERT, L. K. (1974), Iterated limiting recursion and the program minimization 
problem, J. Assoc. Comput. Mach. 21, 436-445. 
SOLO•ONOFF, R. (1964), A formal theory of inductive inference, Inform. Contr. 7, 1-22, 
234-254. 
SWlNBURNE, R. (1973), "An Introduction To Confirmation Theory," Methuen, London. 
TumNc, A. M. (1936), On computable numbers with an application to the Entscheidungs- 
problem, Proc. London Math. Soc., Ser. 2 42, 230-265. 
TURING, A. M. (1939), Systems of logics based on ordinals, Proc, London Math. Soc., 
Ser. 2 45, 161-228. 
WILSON, E. O. (1975), "Sociobiology," Belknap, Cambridge, Mass. 
